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ABSTRACT
Large scale distributed computing infrastructures pose challenging resource man-
agement problems, which could be addressed by adopting one of two perspectives.
On the one hand, the problem could be framed as a global optimization that aims to
minimize some notion of system-wide (social) cost. On the other hand, the problem
could be framed in a game-theoretic setting whereby rational, selfish users compete
for a share of the resources so as to maximize their private utilities with little or
no regard for system-wide objectives. This game-theoretic setting is particularly
applicable to emerging cloud and grid environments, testbed platforms, and many
networking applications. This thesis considers both perspectives.
By adopting the first, global optimization perspective, this thesis presents netEm-
bed: a framework, associated mechanisms, and implementations that enable the
mapping of requested configurations to available infrastructure resources.
By adopting the second, game-theoretic perspective, this thesis defines and es-
tablishes the premises of two resource acquisition mechanisms: “Colocation Games”
and “Trade and Cap”. Colocation Games enable the modeling and analysis of the
dynamics that result when rational, selfish parties interact in an attempt to minimize
v
the individual costs they incur to secure shared resources necessary to support their
application QoS or SLA requirements. Trade and Cap is a market-based scheduling
and load-balancing mechanism that facilitates the trading of resources when users
have a mixture of rigid and fluid jobs, and incentivizes users to behave in ways that
result in better load-balancing of shared resources. In addition to developing their
analytical underpinnings, this thesis establishes the viability of NetEmbed, Colo-
cation Games, and Trade and Cap by presenting implementation blueprints and
experimental results for many variants of these mechanisms.
The results presented in this thesis pave the way for the development of economi-
cally-sound resource acquisition and management solutions in two emerging, and
increasingly important settings. In pay-as-you-go settings, where pricing is based on
usage, this thesis anticipates new service offerings that enable efficient marketplaces
in the presence of non-cooperative, selfish agents. In settings where pricing is not
a function of usage, this thesis anticipates the development of service offerings that
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Managing and arbitrating limited shared resources is a fundamental and difficult
problem in computer systems. In this thesis we look at three resource sharing sce-
narios. The first is the expression of distributed application requirements, of the ca-
pabilities a shared infrastructure’s resources and finding feasible mappings between
them using a constraint satisfaction approach. The second is how to coordinate
individual user’s fractional requirements of shared resources without explicit user
cooperation by exploiting a game theoretic approach. The third is how to minimize
the maximum utilization of users demand for a shared resource in a temporal win-
dow, by providing an incentive system for users to time shift some of their demand
in an automated fashion. The three novel results respectively are: 1) a language
for specifying application resource requirements and infrastructure capabilities, and
three techniques for finding feasible mappings for the applications up to scales in
the order of thousands of nodes and edges, and with response times typically in the
order of tens of seconds, 2) a game-theoretic model, describing the interactions of
users with fractional requirements who share the cost of the resources, and which
let us establish the existence and convergence to equilibrium, as well as bounds
on its efficiency for some concrete cases; and 3) a market mechanism, under which
self-interested agents may trade allocations of a shared resource over time, as to
improve their benefit, while at the same time minimizing the maximum load on the
shared resource. This mechanism is proven to have equilibria and to converge to an
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equilibrium under certain conditions and worst-case bounds on its efficiency are also
proven.
Large distributed applications are now commonplace in many fields of computer
science. In turn, these applications often rely on a large infrastructure to provide the
resources they need. Some examples are datacenter-based systems [BH09], Cloud
Computing [Hay08], Grid Computing [FKNT99], various testbed platforms (e.g.
PlanetLab [PACR03], Emulab/Netbed [WLS+02], GENI [GEN10]), and the Internet
itself. Managing resources on these systems is challenging not only because of their
scale, but also because of the tradeoffs that exist between the many applications
and users sharing the resources. For example, some applications may use a service
with no performance guarantees, while other applications may need to ensure some
minimum performance level. The problem of finding feasible sets of resources that
satisfy the constraints of an application is called the network embedding problem.
In the first scenario, the network embedding problem is posed as a constraint
satisfaction problem where the requirements for various applications and the capa-
bilities of the supporting infrastructure must be matched in order to find feasible
mappings. These problems may be challenging by themselves. In many cases they
have a combinatorial nature and are NP-hard (see for example [WLS+02]), thus it is
unlikely1 that there are algorithms that efficiently find the optimal solution. Given
this difficulty, a practical problem is to devise heuristic techniques that can find
feasible solutions for practical size instances of the problem. A first contribution of
this thesis is netEmbed, a general framework for the specification and solution of
network embedding problems. So, for example, finding the nodes and links for an
instance of a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) so that the maximum delay and avail-
able bandwidth between adjacent nodes meet some constraints, is easily described
within this framework. netEmbed presents: 1) a language for expressing the re-
1unless P=NP
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source requirements of applications, the capabilities of the infrastructure’s resources,
and 2) three mapping algorithms that by using constraint satisfaction approaches,
specifically safe-pruning and candidate set reordering, are able to obtain significant
reductions on the search space and solve problem instances of practical sizes (in
the order of thousands of nodes and links, with running times in the order of tens
of seconds). The correctness of these techniques is also proven, and its scalability
is then evaluated empirically on simulations using both synthetic and trace-driven
workloads. Chapter 3 discusses netEmbed in detail.
The second scenario considers the case where multiple users solve their own net-
work embedding problem and colocate their applications on a common infrastructure.
In particular, if the users have control over the choices of resources for their applica-
tions, and the resources can be shared between two or more users, then the users will
make strategic decisions as to what resources to choose and each user will make its
choice guided by its own, presumed self-interested, objective function. This scenario
is enabled by the many technologies that make it possible to switch resources with
relatively low overheads. For example, networking technologies such as virtual circuit
switching, virtual private networks, or application layer overlays, make it very easy
to create a “virtual network” on top an existing network. Similarly on the server
side, on-demand computing, virtualization and live-migration of virtual machines
are technologies that enable users to very easily reconfigure their applications on top
of an existing infrastructure. Even more, when the actions of one user affect the
other users, an iterative process in which each user adjusts its allocation decisions in
response to the actions of the other users, takes place. In this scenario, fundamental
questions that arise are the existence of equilibrium conditions, if the iteration pro-
cess converges to an equilibrium, and – when equilibria exist – how efficient these
equilibra are.
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Game-theory provides a framework to study these questions. In particular, non-
cooperative games [OR94] address the case where agents make their decisions based
solely in the current state of the system and their own objective function. The most
commonly used notion of equilibrium is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) [Nas51], which
establishes that no agent can improve its benefit by unilaterally changing its action.
When a NE exists, it need not be a global optimum (with respect to a predefined
system metric). In this case, a measure of efficiency is the Price of Anarchy (PoA),
defined as the ratio between the value of the system metric at the worst-case NE
and its globally optimal value [Pap01]. Previous works have considered the game-
theoretic analysis of shared computing infrastructures when the performance, being
used as the valuation metric by the users, is a function of the number of users sharing
the resource. This kind of game is known as congestion games [Ros73]. However,
this model does not apply to computing systems that use a reservation mechanism to
guarantee the minimum performance level of an application. To illustrate, virtualiza-
tion technologies offer the possibility of reserving a fraction of the CPU’s capacity to
a virtual machine, or various networking technologies (e.g. ATM, MPLS, IP+RSVP)
of reserving a fraction of the capacity of a shared link to a particular application. In
cases like these, the performance is no longer the driver of the user’s actions. The
second contribution of this thesis, a study of Colocation Games, addresses this case.
In the Colocation Games setting, users are able to provision a fraction of the shared
resources, and their cost depends on this fraction. This cost-sharing mechanism is
motivated in turn by two factors: It is budget-balanced and it satisfies a notion of
fairness. This cost-sharing model is known as Shapley Cost Sharing [Sha53], and
has also been considered in other applications, such as network formation games
[ADK+04, CR06], and multicast routing [FPS01].
Colocation Games use a game-theoretic framework to answer the fundamental
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questions of this second scenario: It is shown that in general, Colocation Games do
not necessarily have equilibrium, but we also prove that for some important cases
they do. For the cases where equilibria exists, it is also shown that when users
follow best or better response dynamics (best if their action is their optimal action,
better if their action improves with respect to their current state) Colocation Games
converge to an equilibrium. We also show that equilibria are efficient in the sense
that they achieve high resource utilizations. Thus, in applications where in overall
achieving high utilization is important (for example in a testbed high utilization
translates into allocating larger numbers of experiments), Colocation Games provide
a blueprint for a practical mechanism for autonomous agents to allocate resources.
Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of Colocation Games.
The third scenario considers the case where users compete for a shared resource
over time: The users decide when to execute their applications. This leads to a
scheduling problem, which has been widely studied as from an optimization perspec-
tive (e.g. [Leu04]). This problem has also been considered as a congestion game,
in which users compete to minimize the turn-around time of their own applications
[DT09]. Our scenario is different as it considers the case where users have mixtures
of applications: some applications are time-sensitive, while others are delay-tolerant.
Time-sensitive applications are those characterized by a step utility function [She95]
– if a task is completed within an application-dependent time-frame, it is useful, and
otherwise it is useless. For example in networking applications, interactive tasks like
browsing, chatting, and audio/video streaming are very sensitive to response times.
On the other hand, delay-tolerant applications are those that possess some flexibility
with regard to their execution schedule [LR08]. Examples of delay-tolerant applica-
tions are network backups, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) downloads, and bulk data transfers.
The mixture of both classes of traffic causes problems for time-sensitive applications.
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The higher the utilization of a shared link, the longer the response times. This is a
common problem in environments such as a campus network, an enterprise network
or an Internet Service Provider (ISP), where a large number of users share a common
link. The challenge is to devise a mechanism that helps schedule delay-tolerant tasks
when users are non-cooperative. Non-cooperative users may not reveal what compo-
nents of their tasks are delay-tolerant or may go as far as hiding their delay-tolerant
tasks by obfuscating the traffic associated with these applications.
The third contribution this thesis is the Trade & Cap (T&C) marketplace. T&C
is a mechanism where the users of a common resource can trade their shares of the
resource’s capacity, and in doing so, will benefit by improving the performance of
their two classes of applications: response times for interactive applications, and ag-
gregated throughput for delay-tolerant applications. Fundamental properties of the
T&C marketplace such as the existence of equilibrium, the convergence under best
or better response dynamics, and the PoA are proven. The analysis and empirical
evaluation of the T&C mechanism shows that it effectively provides an incentive for
scheduling delay-tolerant tasks in an environment where users are non-cooperative
and that the resulting allocation provides a significant reduction of the maximum




Resource Mapping Techniques for
Distributed Systems
Among the many application domains where the network embedding problem has
been studied, there is a set of attributes that makes it possible to establish important
commonalities and references. Section 2.1 presents a framework that captures these
attributes. Section 2.2 places the contributions of this thesis in context and estab-
lishes the relationships with respect to the existing works. This Chapter provides a
broad overview of the literature and more detailed references, specific to each of the
components are provided in their respective chapters.
2.1 Taxonomy
The main classification axis for the purposes of this thesis is the nature of the par-
ticipants in the distributed systems. On the one hand, if the agents in the system
– the users/applications trying to obtain needed resources – allocate resources ac-
cording to some pre-established mechanism and independently of the benefit each
one receives, it is said that this is a optimization-oriented mechanism and the design
goal is to create mechanisms that achieve some system-wide objective. On the other
hand, if the agents have the possibility of making their own decisions and these de-
cisions depend on the benefit each agent obtains from the system, the agents are
called selfish, and their strategic behavior is more appropriately modeled using game
theory. The lack of coordination between strategic agents usually results in poor
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performance for some system metric of interest. When this is the case, the provider
of the resources may be willing to establish a mediation mechanism that enforces
some form of limited coordination between the users of the resources. This defines
a third category, commonly known as micro-economic mechanisms.
The following taxonomy elaborates on these three main classes of mechanisms:
1. Optimization-oriented mechanisms:
(a) Centralized: There is a single agent that makes the allocation decisions
for the system. This agent controls all the applications sharing the re-
sources. This agent will determine and enforce allocations that optimize
the system’s objective function.
(b) Distributed: In this case each one of the agents makes the allocation deci-
sions on its own, but the distributed mechanism guarantees (or attempts
to approximate) the optimality of a system metric of interest. In these
cases the agents follow (and cannot deviate) a pre-established algorithm
designed to achieve the intended goal.
2. Game-theoretic mechanisms: In this case each agent has its own utility func-
tion. This utility depends not only on its allocation decisions, but also on the
choices of the other agents in the system. These scenarios are usually mod-
eled using game theory, whereby the set of actions of each agent is its strategy
space, and the utility function allows the definition of the best-response as the
action that maximizes the utility for the agent given the current set of choices
made by the other agents. Game-theoretic analysis is typically based on the
rationality assumption that establishes that an agent will choose the action
that maximizes its own utility. There are cases where determining this opti-
mal solution is an NP-Hard problem, for these reason this thesis will also use
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the notion of a better-response when the agents choose an approximated or
heuristic solution of their utility maximization problem.
Game-theoretic mechanisms can be further classified as follows:1
(a) Uncooperative Games [TV07]: When the agents choose their strategy
based solely on the current system state and their utility function. Based
on how they choose their strategy, this class is subdivided in:
i. Pure-strategies games: When the best-response action is chosen de-
terministically.
ii. Mixed-strategies games: When the actions are chosen probabilisti-
cally according to some probability distribution. In mixed strategies
the agent’s goal is to determine the probability distribution that max-
imizes its expected utility.
When analyzing a game, one of the most fundamental questions is deter-
mining its outcome. Although there are many solution concepts, which
lead to various definitions of the outcome, of particular interest from a
systems standpoint are those that describe an equilibrium state. In par-
ticular, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) is commonly used as it defines an equi-
librium between self-interested, non-coordinated agents. A NE is a state
where no agent can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its current
strategy. It is well known that NE are not in general globally-optimal. A
measure of the efficiency at aquilibrium is the Price of Anarchy (PoA),
the ratio between the worst-case NE and the optimal value of the metric
of interest.
(b) Cooperative (cost-sharing) Games [JM07]: In this case it is possible for
a set of agents to coordinate their choice of strategies so that the result
1This decomposition follows the one presented in [NRTV07]
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is beneficial for all the members of the set. The solution concept for a
cooperative game is called a core of the game and it is defined by two
properties: 1) There is no subset of agents than can benefit by changing
their strategies, and 2) It is budget-balanced, i.e. the payments of all
the agents account for the total cost of the allocated resources. The core
property is much stronger than the NE, and it is rare that a cooperative
game has a core.
3. Micro-economic Mechanisms: Mechanisms such as auctions (in their many
forms) and exchange/commodity markets have been widely considered as the
mean for efficiently managing resources in distributed systems.
There are many auctions formats (ascending, descending, sealed-bid, single-
item, multi-item, combinatorial). The combinatorial auction is particularly
interesting for resource management in distributed systems, as the bidding
language allows for expressing properties such as the fact that set of items
are complementaries or substitutes. A set of resources is complementary if the
value of the set is larger than the sum of the individual values of the items.
Two sets of resources are substitutes if either set can perform the function
requested by the buyer.
One particularly interesting mechanism for combinatorial auctions is the Vick-
rey-Clarke-Grooves (VCG) auction [AM04]. It has been proven that VCG is
the only mechanism that maximizes the social welfare (the sum of the private
values of the winners), and that makes truthful bidding the dominant strategy
– no bidder benefits by bidding values other that its true value. It has its
limitations too [San96]. It is not budget balanced (the sum of winner bids
is not equal to the payments to the owners of the resources), the associated
Winner Determination Problem (WDP) is NP-Hard, and it is susceptible to
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various attacks, for example collusion between the bidders.
An exchange market allows the interaction of a set of sellers and buyers. The
goal of the exchange market is to find a market clearing solution: The set
of prices that makes the aggregate demand equal to the aggregate supply of
each commodity in the market. A classical result by Arrow-Debreu [AD54]
establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of this solution. However,
general solutions are known only for the case of linear utility functions [Ye08].
2.2 This Thesis in Context
netEmbed falls within the category of optimization-oriented mechanisms. In netEm-
bed the goal is to find feasible mappings (resource assignments) for a distributed
application. Once found, the resource allocation system can evaluate the optimal-
ity of the feasible solutions to make the allocation decision. Similar problems have
been already considered in the literature, for example in [WLS+02], [ALR03], and
[OAPV05, AOPV08].
In [WLS+02] the authors present wassign a resource allocator for Emulab that
uses a genetic algorithm. Another resource allocator for Emulab is assign, which is
described in in [ALR03]. Both systems are designed with the purpose of maximizing
the number of experiments that can be instantiated in the infrastructure and a fun-
damental characteristic of this system is that the allocation decisions have minimal
effect for the experiment being allocated. This means that for the users the utility
depends only on the fact of being able to execute the experiment or not, and the
system objective of maximizing number of experiments maximizes the social value
for its users.
SWORD [OAPV05, AOPV08] is a mapping service for PlanetLab. It is designed
with the purpose of finding the set of resources that better map the requirements of
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the user’s experiment. Giving the hardness of the problem, SWORD uses various
pruning heuristics to find feasible solutions and returns the best one among the
solutions found.
A problem often found when solving embedding problems with heuristics, the
the abovementioned examples, is that they are prone to false negatives – returning a
“no-mapping found” when a valid mapping exits. An alternative approach is the use
of constraint satisfaction techniques. In fact, this approach has been previously ex-
plored by Considine et al [CBMp03]. netEmbed further develops these approaches
by introducing two techniques: safe-pruning – pruning only unfeasible regions of the
search space, and candidate sets reordering – constructing candidate sets and order-
ing the search based on the size of the candidate sets. Both techniques significantly
improve the scale of problems that can be handled and are false-negative free.
In Colocation Games various self-interested agents colocate their applications on
a shared infrastructure, while sharing the cost of the resources. The agents can
choose the resources for their applications from any of the feasible mappings, reserve
a fraction of the capacity of the resources to guarantee the minimum performance
requirements of the application, and split the cost in proportion to the fraction of
the resource allocated. This represents a departure from classical congestion games,
such as [KP99, CV02, RT02], where there are no performance guarantees, but in-
stead the resulting performance is a function of the number of applications sharing
the resource, and agents compete to improve their own performance. In Colocation
Games performance is a constraint that is enforced by means of a resource reserva-
tion mechanism, and the cost is variable and depends on the reserved fraction of each
resource. Our analysis shows that in general, Colocation Games do not to have a
NE, but some restricted forms of the Colocation Games do have one or more NE and
converge to a NE under better or best-response dynamics. For these restricted cases,
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we prove bounds on the PoA, and a experimental evaluation with actual workload
traces shows that in practice the efficiency of the Colocation Game is better than
the bound, thus making the game a practical mechanism for resource management
between selfish agents. As Colocation Games do not have any coordination mech-
anism – all the agents follow their best or better responses – they are classified as
uncooperative games according to the framework of the previous section.
The Trade & Cap (T&C) marketplace introduces a mechanism that allows the
exchange of “resource shares” between users of a common resource. In particular,
the T&C marketplace is presented as a scheduling mechanism where the users have
various mixtures of interactive and delay-tolerant tasks. In doing so, the T&C mar-
ketplace incentivizes selfish users to schedule the execution of delay-tolerant tasks
during periods of low demand, thus balancing the load on the resource over time.
This is beneficial for the resource provider when the cost associated with the resource
depends on its utilization.2 The idea of scheduling delay-tolerant jobs during periods
of low utilization was presented by Laoutaris and Rodriguez [LR08]. They propose
two approaches to realize this concept. The first is to provide some reward to the
agents who postpone the execution of their jobs. The second is to implement a store
and forward service across some vantage points on the Internet, so that data can
be relayed between those points at periods of low utilization. This second approach
is futher developed in [LSRS09] to provide the means for the delivery of Delay Tol-
erant Bulk (DTB) data. This addresses the problem when the resources and the
jobs that need to be executed are under the control of a single authority, in which
case, the problem is classified as an optimization oriented approach. For the first
one though, no concrete mechanism has been proposed yet. The T&C marketplace
is a mechanism that uses the first approach. This is particularly important for cases
2A common example of this situation is high capacity network connectivity, which is priced
according to the 95/5 rule.
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when the resource consumers are non-cooperative, but only interested in maximizing
their own utility. By giving them the right incentive, it is possible to improve both
the performance of interactive applications, and the peak-to-valley ratio that affects
the provisioning and costs of the provider. The market operates as a mediator that
enables the exchange of “resource shares” between users, thus the T&C mechanism
belongs to the class of micro-economic mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
netEmbed: A Resource Mapping Service
for Distributed Systems
An emerging trend in distributed system design is the use of configurable networks,
in which network resources may be named, acquired, and manipulated by applica-
tions and users in a much more flexible manner than what are possible using current,
standard Internet services. Using today’s Internet services, such as DNS, an appli-
cation is able to resolve (or map) a name to an IP address, but not much more. This
chapter presents netEmbed a mapping service that allows an application to name
resources in a much more expressive fashion – for instance by specifying a desirable
topological configuration of nodes and links, and by constraining the attributes of
such nodes and links.
One canonical example of a configurable network is that of an overlay network
of end-systems. Such overlays are increasingly used as targets of choice for new
distributed applications, including large-scale data management systems, e.g., dis-
tributed data stores [RWE+01, SDR04], content delivery networks [BLBS03, BCMR02,
CDK+03, CRSZ02, KRAV03, KB04], and specialized resource reservation/allocation
services supporting the operation of grid computing [LZZ+04]. Applications running
on overlays require services that allow them to flexibly make content placement de-
cisions, routing decisions, and other decisions regarding resource selection.
Another canonical example of a configurable network is that of network testbeds
such as Emulab/Netbed [WLS+02] and PlanetLab [PACR03], as well as the envi-
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sioned GENI testbed [GEN10]. The development of these network testbeds is mo-
tivated by the necessity of having more realistic experimental environments, where
new protocols and services can be tested under conditions as close as possible to those
found in real networks. Users of (and applications running atop) such testbeds are
allowed considerable flexibility in selecting the sets of resources used in conducting
a distributed experiment.
3.1 The netEmbed Service Model
An embedding service could be thought of as a component of a large distributed
system that other applications could use as a primitive for the realization of their
resource needs. The following are example application scenarios:
• A dynamic multicast service, where an overlay distribution tree must be config-
ured subject to a set of constraints so that some QoS requirements are satisfied.
• A peer-to-peer system, where location, bandwidth and delay of a subset of
nodes, such as “directory nodes” (e.g., the nodes of a distributed hash table)
play an important role in the performance of the look-up service and/or the
overall performance of the whole system.
• A network monitoring system, where the health of the network could be moni-
tored by a subset of nodes satisfying some connectivity and location constraints.
• A sensor network in which it is desirable to locate a subset of sensors that
possess certain capabilities and satisfy some resource, location, and/or network
connectivity constraints.
• A grid application that needs to allocate a subset of nodes with certain capa-
bilities and some connectivity requirements between them.
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Figure 3·1: Architecture of the netEmbed service, showing its basic components.
• A Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) application, where the complete appli-
cation is the result of the composition of services that need to be instantiated
across a collection of distributed resources. The requirements of each service
and the Quality of Service (QoS) constraints of the application limit the pos-
sible choices for allocating the various services.
In such cases, it makes sense to have a resource mapping service where applica-
tions can submit their resource requirement specifications, and in response get a list
of possible resource assignments. Such a service would involve the key components
illustrated in Figure 3·1 and described below:
1. A model of the real network that characterizes the resources available. Such
model could be maintained either by a monitoring service, a resource manager,
or a combination of both.
2. The mapping service itself, to which applications would submit their queries
and get a list of possible mappings. An interactive service would facilitate the
adjustment (negotiation) of the requirements if the query cannot be satisfied, or
allow it to adjust the mapping dynamically, as the application’s needs change.
The service can operate in a distributed fashion simply by keeping an up-to-
date copy of the model on each server.
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3. Optionally, if a resource reservation system is in place, applications would
allocate the selected mapping and the network model would be adjusted ac-
cordingly.
As described, the netEmbed service is focused on finding “feasible” mappings as
opposed to finding an “optimal” mapping. As noted in Chapter 2, the identification
of an objective function depends on the application, and more importantly, on the
entity doing the optimization. Nevertheless, incorporating the evaluation of an op-
timality goal is easily accomplished once the candidates have been found. For these
reasons the scope of netEmbed is limited to the identification of feasible mappings.
3.2 The Network Embedding Problem
This section provides the basic definitions for terms alluded to earlier and present a
formal definition of the Network Embedding Problem, which is used throughout this
thesis.
The term Hosting Infrastructure is used when referring to the target of an embed-
ding service. A hosting infrastructure (e.g., Internet or PlanetLab) is described by a
graph R =< V,E > and a characterization of its links and nodes, which may include
measured metrics represented either as numeric values or ranges, and categorical
classes such as “Link (n1, n2) is 802.11g” or “node n1 is linux-2.6”, for example.
The term Query Network refers to the network that needs to be embedded into
the hosting infrastructure. A query network is given by the graph Q =< V,E > and
a characterization of its links and nodes, which represent constraints on any feasible
embedding. As with the hosting infrastructure, such constraints may be numerical
or categorical in nature.
The term Mapping is used to refer to a one-to-one (injective) function m : Q→ R,
such that for all query network nodes q ∈ Q, r = m(q) ∈ R is the corresponding
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node in the hosting infrastructure, and all node and edge constraints are satisfied
by such mapping. To simplify notation, the notation q → r is used to indicate that
node q maps to node r. In principle, if NQ is the number of nodes in Q and NR is
the number of nodes of R, then any permutation of NQ elements of NR could be a
mapping, making the search space very large even for small values of NQ and NR.
The term Constraint Expression refers to a boolean expression that specifies ad-
ditional relationships that must be preserved by the mapping function. For example,
the user may be interested in a mapping that restricts the average delay between
nodes within a percentage range, or that certain particular nodes get mapped to
physical nodes with certain attributes, e.g. operating system, processor type, speed,
etc. Such constraints take the form of a boolean expression relating query network
nodes/links to hosting infrastructure nodes/links.1
The Network Embedding Problem is the problem of finding a mapping m : Q→ R
that satisfies the constraints established by the Constraint Expression. It may be
the case that the user is either interested in finding feasible mappings, in finding a
mapping that improves his current utility (later on referred to as a better move), or
in finding the optimal mapping, which maximizes its utility or minimizes its cost.2
An Embedding Service is a system that takes as input the description of a hosting
infrastructure and the specification of a query network and returns as output a (pos-
sibly empty) set of mappings from the latter to the former. Typically, an embedding
service would be associated with a single hosting infrastructure that constitutes a
“real” infrastructure and would be used by users or applications to facilitate the
identification of resources that could be used to instantiate a “virtual” network that
satisfies the constraints specified in the query network.
1
netEmbed uses a simple constraint expression language, which will be described later in
Section 3.4.
2The user’s optimal allocation given the current allocations of the other users is called its best-
response, and will be fundamental in the analysis in the subsequent chapters.
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In this work, the terms “hosting infrastructure”, “query network”, and “map-
ping” are used interchangeably with the terms “real network”, “virtual network”,
and “embedding” respectively. The latter set of terms is typically used when refer-
ring to an embedding service tied to a specific infrastructure or testbed.
3.3 netEmbed Mapping Algorithms
This section presents three mapping techniques developed to solve The Network Em-
bedding Problem using constraint satisfaction techniques. These techniques exploit
the constraints of the problem as the means for pruning the search space and are
able to handle practical-size problem instances.
3.3.1 Exhaustive Search with Constraint Filtering (ECF)
A mapping is a NQ-permutation of the NR nodes in the infrastructure network. An
exhaustive search would explore each one of the P
NQ
NR
permutations to find feasible
ones. Näıvely doing so is impractical even for relatively small values of NR and NQ.
ECF organizes the search space in the form of a permutations tree constructed in the
following manner:
1. From the root, there is a branch to each one of the possible mappings of the
first query node.
2. The children of the nodes at the ith level are the possible mappings for the i+1
query node, given the assignments in the previous levels.
Figure 3·2 illustrates this construction.
ECF is a search on this tree. It could be implemented either as a Depth-First
Search (DFS) or a Breath-First Search (BFS). Noticing that the amount of state
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Figure 3·2: Illustration of the permutation tree that defines the search space
required by BFS may be exponentially large3, ECF uses a DFS strategy. In fact,
by handling the sets of nodes as ordered sets (each node has a numerical identifier)
the amount of state information is determined by the current depth, which is at
most NQ. To avoid exploring the whole tree, ECF prunes a branch as soon as it is
determined to be infeasible. Observe that once the mapping to a node is determined
to be infeasible, the entire subtree rooted at this node is unfeasible and it can be
safely pruned.
In addition to the pruning strategy, ECF also does a reordering of the query
nodes to minimize the number of nodes visited. A DFS visits every node in the tree
once, therefore is performance is determined by the size of the tree. By evaluating
node and link constraints, it is possible to determine the sets of candidate mappings
for each one of the query nodes. So for example, for query node q ∈ Q there is a set
of feasible candidates Cq ⊂ R and the set of sets-of-candidates can be ordered by
their cardinality, i.e. {C1, C2, . . .} such that |Ci| < |Cj| for all i < j.
3BFS keeps the queue of nodes for the next level, which at the last level is of the size of the
search space
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Lemma 1 establishes that this reordering step minimizes the size of the tree.
Lemma 1. Minimum Size of the Permutations Tree
The total number of nodes in the permutations tree for a search algorithm is mini-
mized if the algorithm examines the query nodes in an ascending order based on the
number of candidate mappings for each query node.
Proof. Let ni be the number of candidate mappings for virtual node vi. According
to the statement in the Lemma, nodes are examined in increasing order of their
candidate mappings. Thus, ni < ni+1 for 1 ≤ i < NQ and the total number of nodes
in the permutations tree is given by
S = n1 + n1n2 + . . . + n1n2 · . . . ·nNQ = n1(1 + n2(1 + . . . nNQ−1(1 + nNQ) . . .)) (3.1)
Assume that there is an alternative ordering of nodes that yields a smaller total
number of nodes (namely S ′) in the permutations tree—i.e., S ′ < S. In particular,
without loss of generality, assume that such an ordering would switch the order with
which nodes v1 and v2 are examined, which yields the following
S ′ = n2(1 + n1(1 + . . . nNQ−1(1 + nNQ)))
Since, by definition, n2 < n1, then
S ′ − S = n2 − n1 > 0
This implies that the alternative ordering yields a larger total number of nodes—i.e.,
S ′ > S—which is a contradiction. Thus, by having n1 as the first factor minimizes
the total number of nodes if the order of the rest of the nodes is kept fixed. The same
procedure can also be applied to the successive factors (1 + . . . nNQ−1(1 + nNQ)) so
that each consecutive internal factor is minimized as well. In consequence, ordering
the mappings in increasing order by the number of candidates minimizes (3.1).
The above Lemma implies that it is advantageous for the degree of nodes closer
to the root of the permutations tree to be as small as possible. Thus, by applying
the constraint expression the ECF algorithm determines the number of possible
mappings for each virtual node and sorts them in increasing order in a list LS.
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In addition to the above observation, note also that given the current assignments
for q1, ..., qi−1, if qi has edges with any of its predecessors, the number of choices is
reduced even more because these edges have to be preserved.
During the first stage of the ECF algorithm, the constraint expression is applied
to each possible pair of virtual and real edges. As illustrated in Figure 3·3, this
produces a list of candidate mappings per edge of the form:
{(q1 → r1, q2 → r2), ...}
ECF stores this mapping in a data structure that provides the candidates for the
second stage. The data structure is a sparse 3D-matrix F that will be referred to
as the filter matrix. Each cell in F has coordinates (v, r, vs) and contains the set of
candidate mappings for vs, when v is mapped into r. Therefore, each edge matching
adds one element in two cells4:
(q1, r1, q2)← r2 (q2, r2, q1)← r1
Conversely, when there is no match, ECF keeps these results in a second filter
F , constructed in exactly the same way. F will then be useful in restricting the set
of candidates given the current partial mapping.
The ECF algorithm then proceeds as follows:
(1) Pick the first virtual node vs from the sorted list LS, i.e. the one with the least
number of candidates. Being the first, it can be chosen from:
⋃
all v∈NQ,r∈NR
F [v, r, vs] (3.2)
4For the undirected case. If the network is represented as a directed graph only one of the sets
is updated
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Figure 3·3: Illustration of the mappings from a query to a infrastructure
(2) For subsequent nodes, say node vi, choose the mappings from the intersection
of candidates for all previous nodes vj that have an edge with vi and that do not
violate any of the constraints. Real nodes that have been already assigned cannot
be considered. Expression (3.3) gives the set of candidate nodes5. This process













F [vj, rj, vi]

 −
{r1, ..., ri−1} (3.3)
Once the search reaches the N thQ level (the DFS reaches a leaf of the tree), then
by induction this is a valid mapping for the whole query. The complete algorithm
incorporating these filters is given in Figure 3·4.




Candidates← set of real nodes defined by (3.2)
call search(root, Candidates)
function search(node, Candidates)
if node is at depth NQ
report mapping defined by branch from node to root
return
for each c in Candidates
add c as a child of node
NextCandidates← set from filter (3.3)
if NextCandidates is empty return
call search(c, NextCandidates)
remove child c from node
Figure 3·4: ECF Algorithm.
Correctness of ECF: ECF does a depth-first traversal of the permutations tree.
Clearly, if the search visits the whole tree, any possible mapping would be found.
On the other hand, ECF does not visit the whole tree, but prunes a branch as soon
as it finds that there are no feasible mappings for the current query node, at which
point any child branches also fail to satisfy the constraints for the current node and
therefore it does not drop any feasible solutions.
Worst-Case Performance of ECF: In the worst case, the constraints are loose
enough so that any node in the hosting infrastructure is a valid candidate for each
query node, and any edge as well. The hosting infrastructure in the worst case is a
clique (any graph of NQ < NR nodes is a subgraph of a clique of size NR). Under
these circumstances both heuristics fail to prune any candidates and ECF will explore
the entire permutations tree. Section 3.5 presents the results of an empirical analysis,
illustrating that under minimal sets of practical constraints these techniques achieves
an almost linear scalability.
26
3.3.2 Random Walk with Backtracking (RWB)
ECF performs an exhaustive search and retrieves all feasible mappings for a given
query. However, for many applications, finding all feasible embeddings is not neces-
sary. For example an application may just require the identification of any (single)
feasible embedding, or it may require the exploration of a representative subset of
feasible embeddings (i.e., a region of the solution space) in order to optimize resource
allocation over that subset. For such applications or in general when obtaining the
entire set of candidate embeddings is not necessary, and/or if the problem size is
too large to be handled by an exhaustive method, a non-deterministic version of
ECF may be more appropriate. This motivates an alternative to the ECF algorithm
described below.
The algorithm uses the same filtering conditions (3.2) and (3.3) to randomly
choose the next mapping. If at some point the algorithm reaches a dead end, it
backtracks to the previous virtual node and selects another candidate. If at some
level there are no candidates left, it backtracks to the parent node, and so on. If
by backtracking the algorithm reaches the root node, it returns with no solution.
By virtue of the randomness with which candidate mappings are selected, and the
backtracking-nature of the search for a feasible embedding, this algorithm is referred
to as the Random Walk with Backtracking search. The pseudo-code for the algorithm
is shown in Figure 3·5.
3.3.3 Lazy Neighborhood Search (LNS)
Both the ECF and RWB algorithms have a potentially problematic attribute: their
space requirements may become prohibitive, especially for under-constrained queries.
In particular, the worst-case space requirement for the two filter matrices used in both
ECF and RWB is O(n|EQ||ER|). This case could occur for under-constrained queries
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function randomWalkSearch()
current← first virtual node
while(current is not null)
Candidates← set of real nodes from filter (3.2) or (3.3)
minus discarded for current
selected← a random element from Candidates
do until added a child or there are no more candidates
if selected is compatible with current mapping
add selected as a child of current
current← selected
if current is the last node,
return the mapping given by the
branch from current to the root
otherwise
add selected to the list of discarded for current
if could not find compatible child,
current← parent(current) // Backtrack
return ”no solution”
Figure 3·5: RWB Algorithm
over dense networks, since most links would be a match of each other and each filter
position could map close to n candidates. Roughly speaking, the query size could
also be close to the hosting infrastructure, so for dense graphs |EQ| ∼ |ER| ∼ n
2,
giving a worst-case space of O(n5), which even for small query networks (say a few
dozen nodes) may be too large to handle as it will overrun the system’s memory
quickly.6
To reduce the space requirement, the algorithm presented in this section seeks
to minimize the amount of state information kept during the search, and to making
pruning decisions along the way. The main idea behind this algorithm is illustrated
in Figure 3·6.
At any point in time there are three sets: Covered, which contains the set of
6Notice that if the hosting infrastructure is dense (as with overlays, in which there is an overlay
link between every two nodes), then the topological constraints implied by the virtual network do
not help much in reducing the number of candidate edges. This only gets worse if the query is
under-constrained. In the worst-case the graph could be a clique and the set of candidates would
be the set of all edges going to the nodes not yet selected. In this situation, the heuristic introduced
in Section 3.3.1 of sorting by number of candidates becomes ineffective and it is truly exploring the
full permutations tree.
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Figure 3·6: Covered, Neighbor and External sets used by LNS algorithm
virtual nodes already matched, Neighbors, which contains the set of nodes connected
to at least one covered node, and External, which contains the set of query nodes
with no connections to the covered set. At each stage, the algorithm picks one of
the neighbor vertices, and checks if there is a mapping that would allow it to satisfy
topological and query constraints against all covered nodes, and if so, it adds that
vertex to the covered set. This guarantees that all the covered vertices constitute a
valid partial match. Clearly, when all query vertices are in the covered set this is a
complete matching. Figure 3·7 shows the pseudocode of this algorithm.
The actual implementation of this algorithm uses two heuristics to help prune
invalid options as soon as possible: (1) In step 3, the algorithm always picks the
largest degree virtual vertex, so that the Covered set grows quickly to a set of highly
connected nodes. This ensures that neighbors will be more likely to having many
links to the Covered set and therefore less chances of having many valid mappings.
(2) In step 5, while picking any neighbor would be correct, by choosing the one with
more links to the Covered set forces the largest possible conjunction of constraints
that must be satisfied, which helps prune invalid paths as soon as possible.
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Due to its focus on exploring neighboring nodes and its preference for nodes that
would result in less mappings to check for feasibility, this algorithm is referred to as
the Lazy Neighborhood Search algorithm.
function LazyNeighborhoodSearch()
1) Covered, Neighbors ← φ
2) External sets ← set of all vertexes
3) Pick one vertex, move it to the Covered set
4) Vertexes connected to this move to the Neighbor set
5) current← neighbor vertex
6) ConnectingEdges← edges connecting current to covered vertexes
7) For all possible mappings for ConnectingEdges
8) If this mapping satisfies all constraints
9) Add current to Covered
10) Update Neighbors
11) If there are no more neighbors
12) This is a good mapping
13) Return to try alternative mappings
14) Otherwise
15) Go recursively to step 5
16) Otherwise try another mapping for ConnetingEdges
and if none passes, then return there is no mapping
Figure 3·7: The LNS Algorithm.
The implementation of LNS uses a data structure that holds in parallel the sets
of covered, neighbor, and external vertices from both the query and hosting infras-
tructure, as well as boundary edges. It also keeps these sets synchronized when a
virtual→real node-pair moves in/out of the Covered set. The use of this data struc-
ture helps in several ways: (1) It facilitates the choice of the next neighbor (step
5) that has the largest number of links to the Covered set. If Neighbors is small,
this selection will be more efficient. (2) It simplifies the identification of edges that
connect the chosen neighbor to the Covered nodes by keeping the set of boundary
edges.7 (3) It makes it easy to identify that a complete match has been found. Once
the virtual neighbor set is empty, all the virtual nodes have been mapped and all
7Notice that this part is tricky since the correspondence of virtual boundary edges to real
boundary edges is not one-to-one. This is why step 7 checks all possible mappings from a virtual
neighbor to its real neighbors. For any positive match the algorithm recurses until all virtual nodes
have been mapped, or no mapping is possible.
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the constraints are satisfied.
Correctness of LNS:
Definition 1. A promising mapping is a subset of any complete mapping. Observe
that, if there is a mapping, the empty set is always a promising mapping.
Lemma 2. If, at the current state, the covered set of the LNS algorithm is a promis-
ing mapping of size k, then LNS will find a promising mapping of size k + 1.
Proof. Let Pk be a promising mapping of size k at some stage of the LNS algorithm.
Accordingly, the next neighbor selection heuristic selects a neighbor node n and tries
all possible mappings r for this node. As Pk is promising, if follows that there must
be at least one valid mapping for n and by trying them all. LNS will find that
mapping and continue with the promising set of size Pk+1.
Theorem 1. If there is any feasible mapping, the LNS algorithm will find it. If not,
the algorithm will exit with empty solution.
Proof. The first part of the theorem is proven by induction. The algorithm starts
with the empty set which is promising. By lemma 1 it will find any promising
mapping of size 1. At any state k it will find the promising mapping of size k+1 and
when k+1 = NQ these are complete mappings. If there is no solution, the algorithm
tries all extensions of the empty mapping, and after finding none, returns the empty
set.
The correctness of the LNS algorithm follows from the fact that at any state Pk,
LNS tries all possible mappings for the next neighbor and therefore it will find all
feasible promising sets Pk+1, if any.
3.4 Network and Constraint Representation in netEmbed
To be practical, the network embedding algorithms presented earlier require an easy
interface with users and applications. For instance, such an interface should allow
for an expressive specification of the topological as well as the qualitative character-
istics of the hosting (real) and query (virtual) networks, and should also allow for
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an expressive specification of constraints on acceptable embeddings. This section
presents an overview of the choices made along these lines in the implementation of
the netEmbed service.
3.4.1 Network Representation
A network embedding service needs some “standard” representation of the various
networks (graphs) that it handles, e.g., query and hosting networks. To that end,
there are a number of network topology representations available, but for the most
part they have been designed for a specific application domain. For instance topology
generators like BRITE [MLMB01] or GT-ITM [ZCB96] feature their own, different
network description language. Simulation packages like ns-2 [NS209] are integrated
with a programming language (TCL for ns-2) that provides the means to describe
the network as well as to control the simulation. Experimental datasets also define
their own means of characterizing the network. For example, in the particular case
of the all-pair delay traces for PlanetLab [Yos06], the network is represented us-
ing an adjacency matrix that provides the minimum, average, and maximum delay
measurements.
As varied as they are, the above-mentioned network representation approaches do
not provide the generality necessary to describe the real and virtual networks with
arbitrary parameters for nodes and links, as envisioned for netEmbed. For this
reason netEmbed uses GraphML [BEH+01] as it provides a standardized way to
describe the networks. In GraphML a network is represented as an XML document
according to the rules of the corresponding Schema Definition, where the top-level
element is the graph and its children are the node and edge elements. The advantage
of this representation is that is simple and flexible. Moreover, integrity (syntax and
type safety) come for free with the appropriate XML parser.
A particularly attractive feature of GraphML (as it relates to the applications
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envisioned for netEmbed) is its support of arbitrary typed attributes for nodes and
links. For example a topology generation tool may give the average delay, while
a measurement dataset may contain maximum and minimum delays. GraphML
allows capturing all these attributes in the network description, and by means of
the constraint expression language (discussed in the next section) the experimenter
may establish the necessary relations between the corresponding parameters of the
virtual and hosting networks.
3.4.2 Constraint Expression Language
The specification of a constraint expression (in addition to the topological constraints
imposed on the links and nodes of the virtual network) allows for an independent
input to the netEmbed service and associated mapping algorithms, which enable
users/applications the flexibility of specifying constraints that are separate from the
query topology specification. This way, adjustments can be easily made without
modifying the virtual network description. This may be useful in an interactive
application scenario where the user may wish to begin with more stringent constraints
and relax them if there is no compliant mapping.
To provide a general framework for specifying such relationships the netEmbed
implementation includes a constraint expression language, that basically follows the
rules of Java for creating boolean expressions. The language provides the standard
boolean operators (&&, ||, !), relational operators (==, ! =, >, <, >=, <=), a basic
set of arithmetic operators (+,−,∗,/) and a few functions (abs, sqrt). It also follows
the standard Java precedence rules.
The constraint expression is evaluated when comparing every edge of the virtual
network with every edge of the hosting infrastructure. If such an evaluation returns
a true value, the mapping between these edges is accepted. During each evaluation,
the attributes of the links and nodes from both networks are available in the standard
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Hosting Infrastructure Virtual Network Object
rEdge vEdge Edge object
rSource vSource Source node
rTarget vTarget Target node
Table 3.1: Objects available in netEmbed constraint expressions.
dot notation under the names indicated in Table 3.1.
For example, consider a query posed against an overlay network such as Plan-
etLab, for which an all-pairs overlay link delay characterization is available. The
virtual network may specify some requested delay values on its links, which must
be matched up with overlay link delays. Furthermore, the query may specify some
tolerated deviation around the requested link delays in the query network – e.g., a
10% deviation around the requested delays is tolerable. The fragment below shows
how such a constraint may be spelled out using the constraint expression language.
vEdge.avgDelay>=0.90*rEdge.avgDelay && vEdge.avgDelay<=1.10*rEdge.avgDelay
As another example, the fragment below specifies that a match is acceptable as
long as the specified query link delay is within the minimum and maximum overlay
network link delays.
vEdge.avgDelay>=rEdge.minDelay && vEdge.avgDelay<=rEdge.maxDelay
In some applications it may be necessary for some nodes in the query network to
have special attributes that are not necessarily required of other nodes. To facilitate
the expression of these relationships the constraint expressions may use the function
isBoundTo. For example, if some query nodes have the attribute osType equals to




As another use example of the isBoundTo function, consider the case in which
a particular binding needs to be enforced. For example, assume that a given query
node must have access to special hardware (e.g., a particular sensor), then the query
may use the attribute bindTo to indicate this requirement, as shown in the fragment
below.
isBoundTo(vSource.bindTo, rSource.name)
As another example of how the constraint expression language could be used to
relate the specifications of a virtual network to the characteristics of the hosting
infrastructure, the fragment below specifies the requirement that, in any valid em-
bedding, the geographic distance between the desirable location of a query node and
its corresponding hosting infrastructure node cannot exceed (say) 100 meters.
sqrt( (vSource.x-vTarget.x)*(vSource.x-vTarget.x) +
(vSource.y-vTarget.y)*(vSource.y-vTarget.y) ) < 100.0
The implementation of netEmbed uses the well known tools JFlex [JFl] and
CUP [Hud] to implement the lexer and parser of the expression language.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the results of an experimental evaluation of netEmbed, explor-
ing its scalability under both synthetic and trace-driven workloads and infrastruc-
tures.
3.5.1 Experimental Setting
For each one of the experiments, and as illustrated in Figure 3·1, two “networks”
need to be provided to netEmbed: the query (or virtual) network, and the hosting
(or real) infrastructure.
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In the presentation that follows, the hosting infrastructures were either real in-
frastructures, namely PlanetLab [PACR03], or else they were generated synthetically
using Internet topology generators, namely BRITE [MLMB01].
For the generation of the networks used as queries one of three approaches were
adopted.
Using the first approach, the query network is a (typically small) subgraph se-
lected at random from the hosting infrastructure. Such queries would be typical for
applications that require the instantiation of Internet-like topologies, for example,
as would be the case for configurations requested by a user of PlanetLab. One ad-
vantage of using this approach is that since the query is “sampled” from the hosting
infrastructure, it is known in advanced that an embedding exists. This provides good
“test cases” for netEmbed.
Using the second approach, query networks are regular topologies that are syn-
thetically generated (e.g., rings, stars, cliques, etc.). Such queries would be typical
for applications that exhibit a regular communication structure, as would be the case
in high-performance grid applications, for example.
Using the third approach, query networks are irregular topologies that are syn-
thetically generated using a topology generator such as BRITE. The motivation
behind using this approach is similar to that of the first approach (since topology
generators such as BRITE aim to generate “Internet-like” topologies). Additionally,
using a synthetic generator allows studying the effect of the topological characteris-
tics of the query network on netEmbed’s performance, since it makes it possible to
control such characteristics.
The main performance metric considered in these experiments is response time,
which is the time (measured in milliseconds) it takes netEmbed to answer a query.
The response times reported for all experiments presented in this section were ob-
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tained by running netEmbed as the only active process on an Intel Xeon 2Ghz
system with 1GB of main memory (enough for netEmbed to avoid any noticeable
paging).
3.5.2 Evaluation Using PlanetLab
These experiments use the PlanetLab all-pairs ping trace [Yos06] to generate the
hosting infrastructure. This data set provides maximum, minimum and average
delay between PlanetLab sites. Although there are 296 sites in the trace, some
of the sites might not have been running the daemon or were down, so the actual
number of active sites is a little lower and the underlying graph is not a clique. In
any case, the network has 28,996 edges, providing a rich and large enough network
for the tests.
The query networks for the queries were generated as random connected sub-
graphs from the hosting infrastructure (obtained as described above) of size N nodes.
As alluded to before, setting the query to be a subgraph of the hosting infrastruc-
ture guarantees there is always at least one match. For each size query network size,
queries were produced by varying the number of edges (E), and for each (N,E)-pair
creating five different queries, so the results were not biased by a particular network
configuration. The network embedding algorithms were run for each different query
using the same constraint expression in all cases, namely that the real link delay
range is within the specified query-link delay range.
Figure 3·8 (a) shows the performance results for the ECF algorithm. For each
data point, the average and the 90% confidence interval are shown. A second line
indicates the time to find the first match. This is an appropriate performance mea-
sure for applications that require just a single feasible embedding. Given the fixed
size of the hosting infrastructure, the queries were limited to be up to 200 nodes
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Figure 3·8: Mean Search Time for PlanetLab subgraphs
2.5Ghz system. It is worth noticing that, having a fixed-size hosting infrastructure,
the search times seem to grow linearly with the size of the query, indicating that the
filtering heuristic has been quite effective in avoiding the complexity associated with
the full exploration of the search space.
An interesting observation from Figure 3·8 (a) is that the difference between
the time to retrieve all matches and the time to find the first match is very small,
indicating that most of the time was spent in the unmatched region of the search
space – i.e., once solutions are found, many similar solutions are found by varying
just a few nodes (close to the leaves of the tree).
Figure 3·8 (b) shows the time to find the first solution using the RWB algorithm.
Observe that in this case the mean search time shows a very linear relationship with
the size of the query network.
Finally, the results for the LNS algorithm are shown in Figure 3·8 (c). Inter-
estingly, LNS requires essentially constant time to find matches independent of the
query network size. Even more interesting is the fact that for large query networks
there is a slight tendency for the time to decrease. This behavior could be explained
by noting that in large networks, there are usually very few matches, and growing a
partial match implies matching a larger number of constraints.
Figure 3·9 provides a comparison of the three algorithms. Figure 3·9(a) shows
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Figure 3·9: Comparison running queries with PlanetLab as hosting infrastructure
until the first match is found. The ECF and RWB algorithms have very similar
performance, making it clear that the filtering strategy to prune the permutations
tree is the prime contributor to the performance of these two algorithms, and that
once a solution is found; most of the other solutions are close-by. On the other
hand, it is interesting to observe that while on average the LNS algorithm is slow
in comparison, when considering only the first match, its performance is not too
far off. This could be explained by noting that LNS does not have the advantage
of sorting the edges by number of potential matchings. Thus, when an edge that
produces many matches appears early in the selection process, it will result in the
repetition of a lot of redundant work for all the subsequent matches, which will result
in significantly larger times if all matches are to be produced.
Another important question regarding the performance of the various algorithms
is the time it takes them to conclude that an embedding is not feasible. Two sets of
experiments were performed to evaluate this using PlanetLab as a hosting infrastruc-
ture. The first set of experiments uses queries that were known to be feasible (as was
the case above). The second set of experiments uses queries that were known to be
infeasible. The infeasible queries were generated from the feasible queries by chang-
ing some of their link attributes (e.g., delays) to some infeasible values. Notice that
doing so does not change the topology of the query network, only the constraints im-
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Figure 3·10: Search times for feasible versus infeasible queries
for the three algorithms. In general, the performance of ECF and RWB are very
similar, which is consistent with the fact that these algorithms will explore a similar
fraction of the search tree in either case. LNS is noticeably slower. In the cases
where there are not feasible matches LNS returns the no-match result significantly
faster.
3.5.3 Evaluation Using Synthetic BRITE Topologies
Exploring the scalability of these algorithms is not possible with PlanetLab’s topol-
ogy given its fixed size. Also, since the delays on PlanetLab links are characterized
using end-to-end measurements (pings), the resulting topology is mostly a clique,
which is far from being representative of physical (as opposed to overlay) Inter-
net topologies. For these reasons, synthetic topologies generated using the BRITE
topology generator were used for exploring the scalability of these algorithms.
These experiments were conducted with 3 hosting networks of size 1500, 2000
and 2500 nodes respectively. For each one of these networks, various sets of sub-
networks of different sizes were obtained. The results of the three algorithms for these
networks are shown in Figure 3·11. In general, and not surprisingly, the behavior
follows the same pattern observed with PlanetLab topologies: similar average times
for ECF and RWB, with a slight advantage to the latter; high variability and much
larger mean times for LNS. Figure 3·12 shows the mean time to find the first match
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Figure 3·12: Mean Time to Find First Match in BRITE topologies
pronounced.
3.5.4 Evaluation Using Queries with Regular Topologies
The two characteristics that make an embedding difficult to find are: (1) under-
constrained queries, and (2) queries with regular topologies. Under-constrained
queries do not provide enough conditions to significantly prune the search space.
In the limit, the only constraint is that of the query topology, and the problem is re-
duced to a subgraph isomorphism problem. With regular topologies (such as cliques,
rings, stars with equal or no constraints on all edges), any permutation of a partial
match is also a partial match. Thus, if this partial match leads to a dead end, the
embedding algorithms will end up performing the same amount of (useless) work on
every permutation.
To evaluate the performance of netEmbed’s algorithms under these “worst-
case” scenarios, a series of cliques of increasing size were used as queries. The only
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Figure 3·13: Finding Matchings for a Clique
these queries is run against a PlanetLab hosting infrastructure. The query is under-
constrained as there are about 6,700 edges that fall in this delay range and the query
topology is regular.
Figure 3·13 (a) shows the mean time to find all embeddings of a clique in Planet-
Lab as a function of the clique size. Those cases in which no solutions were found, or
in which the algorithm timed-out before returning any solution are excluded, so as
not to affect the trend of the graph. It is worth noting that under this query model,
LNS always times out before it is able to find all embeddings.
Figure 3·13 (b) compares the three algorithms using the time to find the first
match. In this case, the LNS algorithm greatly outperforms the other two. When
it finds a solution it finds it quickly as the heuristic to grow the matching with the
vertex with more constraints helps prune non-matching cases rapidly as this forces
each new vertex to match all the already selected vertexes. On the other hand, the
regular structure forces the algorithm to start over when finished with a candidate
matching explaining the long running times for the average case.
A last set of experiments were conducted involving composite queries. A com-
posite query is a two-level hierarchical topology, where both levels have regular
structures. So for example the root level could be a ring, a star, or a clique, and
each vertex of the root level is also a regular structure. Many practical applications
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Figure 3·14: Finding matchings for composites of regular topologies
name some examples. Two sets of queries were prepared. The first set has regular
constraints per level – namely, all links at the root level have a delay constraint be-
tween 75 and 350ms, representing inter-site wide-area delays, and all the links on the
lower level have delay constraints between 1 and 75ms, representing intra-site delays.
These values of the delays were chosen from the distribution of delays in PlanetLab
so that there are abundant links in both ranges. The second set shares the same
topological structures as with the first set, but features delay constraints that are
randomly assigned from the 25-175ms range, which contains about 70% of the links
in PlanetLab. For both sets, there are usually thousands of matchings for each query,
so the interesting measure here is the average time to find the first match. Figure
3·14 shows the results for (a) the regular and (b) the random constraint assignment
cases.
The interesting observation about these two cases is that (as with the first match
in the case of cliques) LNS finds the first solution in almost constant time and by
far outperforms the other two algorithms. This reinforces the previous conclusion
that in under-constrained queries and high-density graphs LNS is better suited to
find the first solution.
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3.5.5 Quality of Returned Results
Using any one of the embedding algorithms, netEmbed may return one of three
types of results: (1) The complete set of all feasible embeddings, (2) A subset of all
feasible embeddings, and (3) An inconclusive response.
The complete set of all feasible embeddings (including none, if the query network
is impossible to embed) is returned when the algorithm terminates before its preset
timeout has expired. A partial set (subset) of all feasible embeddings is returned
when the algorithm times out after finding some (but not necessarily all) feasible
embeddings.8 Finally, the algorithm is said to have an inconclusive response, if it
fails to produce any feasible embedding by the timeout. Notice that in this case, it
is inconclusive whether or not a single feasible embedding exists.
Figure 3·15 shows the probability of each one of these results for all the experi-
ments presented earlier in this section. Except for one case, in which RWB behaves
poorly, the probability of finding matches was over 70%. Even more impressive, for
some types of queries, ECF and LNS were able to find all feasible matches with a
probability of 75% to 82%. Looking at the probability of finding any embedding
(as opposed to all embeddings) for ECF and LNS, observe that for queries with
regular topologies (clique and composite), LNS has a better chance of success. This,
combined with the much better performance in terms of response time, makes LNS
ideal for these kinds of queries. On the other hand, for very constrained queries,
where filtering results in much more effective pruning, ECF outperforms LNS in
both chances of success and response time.
8Notice that RWB will always return a partial result (or no results) since by design it terminates
as soon as it finds the first solution.
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Figure 3·15: Probability distribution of the different types of results
3.5.6 Performance Results Relative to Existing Techniques
Previously published techniques ([ALR03], [WLS+02], [WLG02], [ZA06], [CBMp03],
[OAPV05]) give a baseline for the purpose of comparison. Most of these existing
techniques handle only small networks, typically tens of nodes, and have reported
response times in the order of tens of minutes or more. As it has been shown in
the previous sections netEmbed handles much larger networks with response times
that vary from a fraction of a second to a few minutes depending on the query 9
3.6 Related Work
The network embedding problem, as an optimization problem, appears in many
distributed application environments. The following is a synopsis of the most repre-
sentative works classified according the the application area.
9It is hard to make a direct comparison between these various techniques since, as alluded in
Chapter 2, most of these techniques are designed to find optimal mappings and/or are designed to
deal with very particular kinds of mappings.
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3.6.1 Resource Discovery and Allocation for Testbed Platforms
Testbeds platforms such as Emulab [WLS+02], PlanetLab [PACR03], and GENI
[GEN10] offer resources for running large-scale experiments on networking and dis-
tributed systems. The first two have been operational for many years now, therefore
the research community has had the opportunity to experiment with various re-
source management schemes. In the case of GENI, which as of 2010 is still under
development, its underlying resource management mechanisms have not yet been
published.
Emulab’s core is a centralized pool of servers interconnected by high-speed Eth-
ernet LANs. The servers themselves belong to a few classes of homogeneous servers.
When instantiating an experiment, some of the servers act as nodes for the applica-
tion, while other severs perform the function of emulating network links, for which
transmission rate, packet losses and propagation delay may be programmatically as-
signed. In addition to the emulated resources, an experiment can combine simulated
resources (via NSE an extension for the NS-2 simulation package [NS209]) and real
resources from PlanetLab. This gives the experimenter a large amount of flexibil-
ity when instantiating experiments. Resource management in Emulab is centrally
controlled and the goal of the allocation mechanism is to maximize the number of
concurrent experiments. The problem has been identified as an NP-hard problem;
therefore various heuristics have been proposed to find feasible solutions: wassign
[WLS+02] uses a genetic algorithm and assign [ALR03] uses a simulated annealing
algorithm. In both cases, a scoring system is used to measure the quality of a so-
lution and the solution that places the least demand on the more limited resources
(e.g. inter-switch bandwidth) is preferred.
PlanetLab is a distributed testbed whose resources are provided by academic
and industry institutions. An institution provides some servers with Internet con-
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nectivity, and relinquishes the control of these servers to PlanetLab Central, which
administers all PlanetLab nodes. The contributed servers represent a heterogeneous
mixture of machines from different vendors and hardware generations. For instan-
tiating an experiment the user submits a request specifying the set of nodes, and
if accepted, PlanetLab central creates a slice which embodies the set of resources
(nodes) allocated to the experiment. The slice is composed of one sliver per allo-
cated node, and the slivers are instantiated on the servers using an extension of the
Linux Virtual Server technology which provides a limited form of resource isolation
between colocated slivers.
As opposed to Emulab where the topology is instantiated to match query speci-
fication, in PlanetLab the underlying infrastructure is fixed and the experimenter’s
goal is to find a set of nodes that match the query specification. For this reason
SWORD [OAPV05, AOPV08], a mapping service for PlanetLab, was designed to
minimize the mapping error: an indicator of how close is a given set of nodes from
a query specification. To do this, SWORD maintains a database of static and dy-
namic information about PlanetLab nodes and their links. Dynamic information
such as average CPU load, available bandwidth and inter-site latency is periodically
updated by using several monitoring services. SWORD query language adopts a
simplified topology representation, supported by the fact that it captures the needs
of typical applications. In this model, the requested resources are divided in groups,
such that the requirements for all the nodes within a group are very similar. The
query language permits the specification of intra-group requirements and inter-group
requirements. Intra-group requirements constrain the choice of nodes for the group
based on both, per-node and node-connectivity requirements. Inter-group require-
ments specify the connectivity between groups in terms of available bandwidth and
latency. The queries also include penalty functions which give a notion of how good
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a given mapping is. Since the mapping problem is an NP-hard problem, SWORD
adopts a search technique that leverages the hierarchical structure of the query lan-
guage. In a first phase, it evaluates the per-node penalties and enumerates feasi-
ble node candidates for each one of the groups. In the second phase, it computes
the intra-group penalties among the possible node-candidates and again returns the
group candidates with lowest penalty. In the last phase, it uses the candidate groups
from the previous phase to evaluate inter-group penalties and returns those map-
pings that give a small total penalty. By adjusting the penalty threshold and the
time-outs for each one of the stages it is possible to bound the run time of the match-
ing algorithm. The main tradeoff of SWORD is that it is susceptible false negatives:
a not found answer, even when solutions might exist.
3.6.2 Overlay Networks
Overlay networks have been amply considered in the literature as the means to
improve performance metrics observed by applications. So, for example, Resilient
Overlay Networks (RONs) [ABKM01] aim to improve the reliability, while Service
Overlay Networks (SONs) [DZH03] aim to provide QoS guarantees in the form of
bandwidth and end-to-end delays.
In the case of RON, the overlay nodes operate as a distributed system where
all nodes cooperate in implementing the routing function. Although RON does not
consider the possibility of selfish nodes joining the overlay, it could occur in prac-
tice. A selfish node could easily free-ride the service by “lying” on his link-state
advertisements10.
In the case of SON, overlay nodes are assumed to be under a single ownership,
therefore the overlay owner enforces node cooperation. The topology of the overlay
10When node A sends a link state message to any of its neighbors, say node B, it only announces
knowledge of the link A-B. So, no neighbor will find routes going through A.
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and the routes assigned to each flow are inputs to the system. In order for the overlay
to be able to provide a guaranteed service, it acquires the capacity on each one of the
underlay’s links under the terms of a Service Level Agreement (SLA). This process
establishes the costs associated with each underlying link. Given the costs of the
resources and the revenue made by the overlay, the problem for the owner is a utility
maximization problem subject to QoS constraints, whose approximate solution can
be computed analytically or numerically.
When the set of routes is not known/given in advance, overlay creation becomes
a more challenging problem. The works by Zhu and Ammar [ZA06] and Yu et al
[YYRC08] are example works that consider this situation. In the first case, the
assumption is that a global entity (say, the system operator) has control over all
the overlays that need to be created. The operator’s problem is to assign underlay
resources (nodes and links) to all the overlays in such a way that it minimizes a com-
bination of the maximum link and node stress. The stress is a utilization metric, so
for the case of overlay nodes, the stress is proportional to the number of users sharing
the node, and for network links, it is proportional to the total capacity allocated on
the link. The motivation for this metric comes from the fact that minimizing the
maximum stress helps avoid saturating bottleneck resources, giving more chances
for being able to allocate new overlays when they arrive, and minimizing the impact
on the performance as, by standard queueing models, the service delay is heavily
dependent on resource utilization.
The work by Yu et al [YYRC08] also considers the case where multiple overlays
need to get resources from a common substrate infrastructure. In this case, asso-
ciated with each overlay is a revenue function which measures the benefit obtained
by the overlay customer as function of the virtual nodes and links that compose the
overlay over time. The goal of the system is then to find mappings that maximize the
49
total revenue. The solution approach uses greedy heuristics (as finding the optimal
is an NP-Hard problem). These heuristics split the mapping process in two phases:
Mapping the virtual nodes, and then mapping the virtual links. The first phase sorts
the request in decreasing order by their revenue (noticing that the revenue is inde-
pendent of the chosen mapping) and allocates nodes for them for as long as there is
capacity left in the substrate nodes. The second phase allocates virtual links using
the k-shortest path algorithm to search for a path that satisfies the bandwidth re-
quirement of the overlay link. They also present an alternative method for mapping
virtual links: As the revenue per virtual link is independent of the mapping to the
substrate, virtual links can be split into fractional flows over various substrate paths.
By doing so, the virtual link mapping problem can be transformed into a fractional
multicommodity flow problem, which is solvable in polynomial time using standard
linear programming algorithms. Being a heuristic approach, there are no assurances
on the optimality of the solution and it is also prone to return false negatives.
3.6.3 Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)
Many large scale development systems use the notion of composable services, (e.g.
SOA, EJB, DCOM, CORBA, RPC, Grid/Globus, MPI). A high-level application
functionality is built by composing some of those services. The resulting application
is typically represented by a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). The actual services may
be assigned to the substrate resources in many possible ways, but the performance
of the application is heavily dependent on the way such assignment is made. For
example if two components transfer large amounts of data between them, is better
to place them closer together to avoid the large latency of delivering the data over
low capacity links.
An example architecture for allocating resources in a service composition envi-
ronment is presented by Yu et al [YL05, YZL07]. In this system the applications are
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represented as DAGs and have quality of service attributes which must be satisfied by
the assigned substrate resources. A utility function is defined in terms of the quality
parameters, so that larger utility corresponds to an assignment that gives better ap-
plication performance. When the DAG has a sequential flow structure, the allocation
problem reduces to a Multidimensional Multichoice Knapsack Problem (MMKP). In
the case of general graph structure the problem reduces to a Multiconstrained Op-
timal Path (MCOP) problem. Since both problems are NP-complete, the authors
propose several heuristics to handle each case. In their work, the utility function is
defined per application, and a central broker executes the search algorithms to find
feasible locally-optimal solutions. The implicit assumption in this model is that al-
locations are enforced by the system and that different applications do not interfere
with each other, therefore their utilities are independent (the actions of one user
have no effect on others).
Another representative example is SpiderNet [GNY04]. Similarly to the previous
example, applications are represented as DAGs and have predetermined QoS goals.
The main difference is that the SpiderNet architecture is fully distributed. To this
end, it defines a protocol for discovering feasible mappings that all participating
nodes are assumed to follow. It also offers the capability of finding backup mappings
for quickly recovering from failures. As there may be multiple mappings for any given
application, and many applications may share the same set of basic services, the
allocation algorithm uses as an objective of the optimization a metric defined as the
weighted sum of demand-to-availability ratios over all the resources. The mapping for
an application is chosen as the one that minimizes this metric, motivated by the fact
that doing so helps load-balance the resources. The discovery protocol uses a limited-
flooding strategy for the discovery process, which helps improve the scalability of the
system. This heuristic makes the system susceptible to false negatives, as a feasible
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solution (or the optimal one) may be pruned in the limited flooding phase.
3.7 Summary
Large distributed testbeds are the backbone of new applications, some of which will
possibly reach maturity and be deployed on the Internet. Service providers aware
of the market opportunity are already offering dynamic on-demand infrastructures
where these services can be deployed in various forms of Cloud Computing offerings.
The problem of selecting the resources over which a given system is going to be
deployed permeates from the testbed to the Cloud environments and the demands
on scalability and performance are expected to be more stringent as these systems
are used for commercial purposes.
netEmbed addresses this problem by exploiting the fact that embedding prob-
lems include various forms of constraints, which help prune and efficiently explore
the search space, making the problem tractable for instances of practical size.
As for the search problem itself, netEmbed provides various heuristics to find
the one or more feasible mappings for the query application. These heuristics are
proven to be free of false positives and false negatives, although occasionally may be
computationally intensive.
The scalability of netEmbed was studied on an actual implementation of the
service, using a set of representative infrastructures and queries that capture some
of the most relevant properties needed for real applications, showing its ability to
handle problem instances of practical sizes.
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Chapter 4
Colocation Games: Sharing Resources by
Splitting the Costs
The previous chapter presented netEmbed as a framework for applications that
need to find resources from a distributed infrastructure. Using netEmbed the prob-
lem was limited to the decision of a single application. An immediate extension is
to consider the case of multiple applications sharing the infrastructure. A trivial
case is that where the utility/cost for each application is independent, therefore the
best mapping depends only on the current system state (basically what resources
are or are not available) and not on how the resources are shared. When the way of
sharing the resources affects the utility/cost for each user, the actions of the users
are no longer independent. This scenario is typically modeled as a strategic game
under the rationality assumption:1 each user will do what is best according to its
own utility function. This chapter explores the network embedding problem under
the assumption that rational users share the infrastructure.
The relevance of this problem is supported by the many examples of distributed
computing infrastructures, designed to be shared among many customers, e.g. In-
frastructure as a Service (IaaS) offerings, testbed platforms, network overlays, P2P
systems, grid computing, etc. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is the case in many of
1It should be noted that for the purposes of this work in general, “the user” is understood as a
software agent acting on its behalf. The rationality assumption itself has been seriously questioned
[Fol07] in economics, but this work assumes that the algorithmic agents interacting in these systems
are impervious to other motivations.
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these systems that users can make their own allocation decisions. In doing so it
is expected that users will follow a strategic behavior whereby their actions reflect
their intent to improve their own utility/cost. The existence of federated computing
infrastructures and technologies such as virtual machine and network virtualization
makes this strategic behavior possible: First, because there is no single authority
controlling the system, and second because switching from one configuration to an-
other becomes easier and relatively inexpensive.
Existing literature on algorithmic game theory has explored various forms of
games where sharing resources makes the utility of users interdependent. For ex-
ample earlier works such as [KP99, CV02] explore the problem of routing n flows
through m parallel links (or equivalently executing n tasks in m parallel proces-
sors), under the assumption that flows (tasks) can be fractionally split. All flows
(tasks) share a fraction of the capacity of each link (processor) and the time it takes
to complete a job increases with the number of flows sharing the link. Therefore,
the strategy for each flow is to split its work among the m links in such a way
that minimizes its completion time. This system is modeled as a mixed-strategies
game. It is shown that a Nash Equilibrium (NE) always exists and that the Price of
Anarchy (PoA) is bounded. These works have been extended to consider the cases
where the network has an arbitrary topology [RT02], or the flows/tasks cannot be
fractionally split [FKK+02, AAE05]. The later cases are modeled as a pure-strategies
game.
The previous examples focus on the performance as the metric that defines the
utility for the user. Rational actions are those that improve the performance for
the respective user. Observe however that for scenarios where there is a reservation
system in place, performance is no longer a motivator of user actions. Each user is
guaranteed a minimum QoS by means of a SLA with the service provider.2 Viola-
2Although not widely available yet, it is expected that as customers demand it, providers will
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tion of the SLA incurs on a penalty for the provider. On the other hand, there is
an explicit pricing scheme and it is the user’s goal to minimize its own cost. Also,
it is common for providers to quantize the allocation units, for example offering
small/medium/large instances of its resources. Under these circumstances, it is pos-
sible for users to benefit from sharing some of these resources. For example, if users
A and B need an instance larger than the small instance, but they would underutilize
the medium instance, it may be the case that by sharing a large instance they both
get what they need and end-up paying less than the cost of two medium instances.
It is possible then for users to engage in a strategic behavior with the purpose of
improving their own positions. In particular, the Colocation Games introduced in
this chapter model this strategic behavior for the case when the users split the cost
of the resources in a fair manner: each user pays in proportion to the fraction of the
utilization due to his applications.
Fairly sharing the cost of the resources has been previously explored in the case of
routing flows in a network [CR06]. In this case each flow has an associated weight and
the payment to each link is the Shapley share of the sum of the weights sharing the
link. As a matter of fact, this model is very close to the Colocation Game, except
that the Colocation Game generalizes for arbitrary subgraphs (instead of source-
destination flows), allows for different weights on each link and each node (instead
of having a constant flow from source to destination), and also incorporates the
notion of constraints (such as performance or functionality constraints – as previously
covered in Chapter 3).
This chapter begins by extending netEmbed’s model (§4.1) in order to incor-
porate the sharing of resources by multiple users3 using the Shapley cost as the
mechanism for fairly splitting the costs. Section 4.2 presents the analytical results,
begin offering guaranteed services spelled out through SLAs.
3This text uses the terms ’users’ and ’applications’ interchangeably to indicate each one of the
independent entities interested in allocating some resources.
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which include proving that the decision problem of determining the existence of a
NE is NP-complete and provides several special cases in which the NE always exists.
For some of these cases it is also proven that for the Colocation Game better/best-
response dynamics always converge to the NE. These cases are interesting as they
provide the means for implementing a fully distributed, online and self-organizing
resource management system, such that the selfish/rational actions of the users lead
to a mapping of resources that achieves high utilization. The sketch of this imple-
mentation, including various heuristic solutions to the better response problem, is
presented in Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 presents a performance evaluation of
the Process Colocation Game (PCG) using both, synthetic and real traces. These
experiments corroborate the analytical results and also highlight the actual efficiency
of the PCG as a mechanism for allocating resources in a distributed environment.
The experimental results indicate that in practice the overall utilization obtained by
this mechanism is much better that than the worst-case bounds established during
the analysis.
4.1 Colocation Games: Definitions
Back to the context of the network embedding problem (§3.2), assume there is a
hosting infrastructure G =< V,E >. Vertices (or nodes) in G represent standalone
resources, whereas edges represent relationships between these resources. Examples
of standalone resources include processors and storage, both of which would be rep-
resented as vertices in G. Examples of relationships between standalone resources
include communication links and dependency relationships, both of which would be
represented as edges in G. Note here that edges in G may be directed or undirected.
For instance, a pipeline of processing units would be represented using a chain of
vertices, in which each pair of adjacent vertices are connected using a directed edge,
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whereas a cluster of processing units on a LAN would be represented using a fully-
connected subgraph, in which each pair of vertices are connected using an undirected
edge.
Let the labeled graph T model the set of resources and underlying relationships
that are necessary to support a specific user application or task, also called a query
in G. This graph will be referred to as the user requested task graph. Vertices and
edges in T have the same meaning as those in the hosting graph G. Labels in G or
T may decorate either vertices or edges. In a hosting graph, labels specify supply
attributes such as unit capacities and unit prices of processing or communication
links.4 In a task graph, labels specify demand attributes such as the minimum CPU
utilization and storage needed by a standalone process, or the minimum bandwidth
tolerable by communicating processes, etc. in the task. Notice that resources may
have multidimensional capacities. For example, a Virtual Machine (VM) instance
specifies capacities along three dimensions corresponding to CPU, RAM, and disk.
Thus, it is convenient to refer to the supply of (or demand on) a resource with a
capacity (utilization) vector.
As illustrated in Figure 4·1, a set of requested task graphs (one per user) consti-
tutes the overall workload to be hosted on the infrastructure graph G. A mapping M
of the (vertices and edges in the) set of request graphs to the (vertices and edges in
the) hosting graph constitutes a configuration underscoring a specific assignment of
users to resources. A valid configuration is one wherein supply meets demand – for
example, the aggregate demand (e.g., CPU utilization) of all users sharing a vertex
in G do not exceed the supply (e.g., CPU capacity) of that vertex. Given a valid
configuration, the infrastructure provider expects to be paid for any resource in G
4Without loss of generality, this chapter uses capacity and pricing, noting that other attributes
may well be considered, e.g., the maximum delay on a link or the OS version and supported APIs
on a processing unit. Such attributes would be used to determine the feasibility of mapping vertices
and edges from T to G, same as it was the case in Chapter 3
57
Figure 4·1: The Colocation Game
used by at least one task (user), but not for (idle) resources to which no tasks were
mapped. The price charged per resource is fixed, independent of the number of users
sharing that resource. The cost incurred by a user is given by a cost function, which
apportions the price of each resource in G among all users with tasks mapped to that
resource. The cost function can be seen as the marketplace mechanism that governs
and induces symbiotic relationships among rational, selfish agents (the users). This
thesis adopts a specific form of cost functions that may be conceived as fair – namely,
those that split the fixed cost of a resource among tasks in some proportional (e.g.,
linear) fashion based on the utilization of that resource by the various tasks assigned
to it. This cost function is known as the Shapley Cost [NRTV07].
4.1.1 The General Colocation Game (GCG):
Given a hosting graph G =< V,E > where each vertex and edge in G is labeled with
a resource capacity vector (R) and a price (P ), and given a collection of tasks, each in
the form of a graph Ti =< Vi, Ei >, where each vertex and edge in Ti is labeled with
a weight underlying a resource demand vector (W ), the General Colocation Game
is the pure-strategies game, in which each task is able to make a (better response)
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move whereby, if possible, the task modifies a valid mapping M into another M ′ so
as to minimize its own cost, given by a function cM(Ti) for the cost of task Ti when

















where wij is the weight (or utilization) imposed on resource j by task Ti, Pj is the
price of the resource, and Uj is the total utilization of the resource (by all tasks
assigned to the resource by M). This cost function assures the budget is balanced:
the sum of payments to any individual resource is equal to its price.






4.1.2 The Process Colocation Game (PCG):
PCG is a restricted (simpler) version of GCG. This simplified version is interesting
as it possesses some properties not present in the GCG. In a PCG, a task graph
consists of a single vertex representing an independent process (say a computation)
that needs to be assigned to a single resource (say a processor). In a PCG, the cost
function for process i when mapped to resource j is









wi ≤ Rj (4.4)
5Throughout this chapter, the processes and resources of an user are referred to by the user’s
index, e.g., i instead of Ti.
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Assuming all processes (users) are rational and selfish, the only move that a
process would make in PCG is one that results in a reduction of its own cost and
(as will be shown later) would also benefit other processes with which the process
would be colocated as a result of the move. When a process i moves from resource a
to resource b, two situations are possible. In the first situation, the move by process
i does not result in a displacement of any of the processes on resource b. These are
called placement moves. This situation occurs if resource b has enough capacity to
host process i (in addition to all the processes already on it before the move). In
this case, it is easy to show that the utilization of resource b increases and that the
cost for all processes already on resource b is reduced. In the second situation, the
move by process i results in displacing one or more of the processes that were on
resource b before the move. These are called replacement moves. For a replacement
move to be possible the cost of all processes that are not replaced by the move must
be reduced (another way to look at this move is to think of the final set of players
as a coalition – they join together in b as this reduces the cost of all the members
of the coalition). This will be the case if the move results in a strict increase in the
total utilization of b.
Let U ′b refer to the utilization of resource b after a move by process i into it.
Clearly, for both placement and replacement moves, U ′b > Ub – i.e., U
′
b increases
as a result of the move. The only reason for a process i to “move” from resource
a to resource b is that cb(i) < ca(i). This yields the following conditions for what
constitutes a valid move by process i into resource b:








4.1.3 The Multidimensional Process Colocation Game (MPCG):
As alluded to before, a resource (vertex) in the hosting graph may have a multi-
dimensional capacity (recall the CPU, memory, and storage attributes of an EC-2
instance) and is thus represented by a capacity vector Rj = [rj1, . . . , rjd] and a fixed
(scalar) price Pj. A natural representation of the demand from such a resource is
a vector Xi = [xi1, . . . , xid], whose components represent the task’s demand (or re-
quested utilization) from each dimension of the resource. A MPCG is a game in
which resources (and process utilizations) are multidimensional.
For the purpose of defining a cost function and valid moves for MPCG, the
definitions from the previous section need a few adjustments. In particular, a set of
tasks can be assigned to resource j if the sum vector of demands is component-wise
less than the capacity vector:
∑
i∈j
Xi ≤ Rj (4.6)
To apportion the multidimensional resource price among the processes colocated at
the resource, define the multidimensional utilization of a single process by its volume:
vi =
∏d
k=1 xik. The total utilization of all processes colocated at resource j is the
sum of the multidimensional utilization of these processes: Uj =
∑
i∈j vi. This leads
to the following definition for the cost of task i when allocated to resource j (noting
again that the sum of the cost for all tasks colocated at resource j matches the price
set for resource j):




In a MPCG, a valid move is one that meets the feasibility constraint (4.6) and that





. As before, this definition extends to replacement moves as well,
by assuring that the task that moves and the tasks that remain in the destination
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reduce their costs







4.1.4 The Parallel Process Colocation Game (PPCG):
This is a extension of PCG which allows for tasks to consist of a set of parallel
processes. In PPCG, the hosting graph G is a complete graph of n vertices (or nodes),
where the ith node has resource capacity Ri and price Pi. In PPCG, a workload
consists of a collection of task graphs T1, . . . , Tm, where task graph Ti consists of a
set of ki nodes, each of which with a specific utilization requirement (weight). Thus
Ti is fully specified by parameters (ki, wi1, . . . , wiki), where ki is a positive integer
denoting the number of nodes (e.g., processors) needed by Ti and 0 < wij ≤ 1
denotes the utilization demanded from node j.6 Notice that by definition, the ki
nodes requested by Ti must be mapped to different nodes in the hosting graph G.
When wi1 = wi2 = ... = wiki , in this case Ti is called a uniform parallel process and
the resulting game is referred to as a uniform PPCG (non-uniform PPCG, otherwise).
As described above, in PPCG there are no topological constraints on the set of
nodes requested by a task (process) since graph Ti featured no edges. In general,
however, a parallel process may specify a particular topology, which must be satisfied
in any valid mapping of the task graph onto the hosting graph. Of particular interest
are parallel process colocation games in which the parallel processes have regular
topologies (e.g., a ring, a mesh, a hypercube, etc.) Also, as described above, in
PPCG the hosting graph was a complete graph. In general, however, the hosting
graph itself may feature a regular topology onto which the parallel process structures
would be mapped. Again, of special interest are hosting graphs that exhibit regular
topologies.
6Clearly, standard PCG is a special case of PPCG where ki = 1.
62
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4·2: Examples of Colocation Games with no Nash Equilibrium.
4.2 Analytical Results
Nash Equilibrium of GCG: The GCG does not necessarily have a NE, as illus-
trated by the examples in Figure 4·2.
Consider example (a), where the hosting graph is an m-vertex ring, and each
vertex is of unit capacity. Each of the n (2 ≤ n < m) tasks consists of two connected
vertices, with utilization requirements 1/2 < αi ≤ αmax < 1 and 0 < ǫi < 1− αmax,
respectively. Observe that two tasks, say T1, T2, cannot be assigned to the same
hosting nodes ti, ti+1, as the sum of two α nodes exceeds one. Feasible configurations
are pairs of consecutive nodes. As n < m, there will always be at least one edge
(α → ǫ) connecting a pair of unmatched nodes, as some segment of the hosting
graph will not be used. Without loss of generality, let T1 be the task whose α node
is free, and task T2 be the task whose ǫ node is free. The GCG cost function implies
that the best strategy for T2 is to move so that its ǫ node shares the hosting node
with the α node of T1. Then, considering the set of strategies of all tasks, no matter
what strategy Ti chooses, there will always be at least one free edge, and the task
Tj whose ǫ node is free will be better off relocating. Since this holds for all possible
strategies of all tasks, concluding that there is no equilibrium.
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Similarly, in example (b) the interests of both players conflict. In this example
each player asks for three different CPUs, with the additional requirement that the
CPUs must be adjacent. In the configuration shown the top player would benefit by
swapping the position of tasks 0.5 and 0.1, as its cost goes from 1.79 to 1.75. After
this move, the best response for the other player is to swap its 0.5 and 0.3 nodes as
his cost reduces from 2.25 to 2.20. At this point, this configuration is the symmetric
of the original one, and the players will keep iterating forever.
Example (c) illustrates even another case, where the small task (node of weight
0.4) prefers to join the node of value 0.6 of the large task, which gives a cost of 0.4,
the minimum possible for that player. However, the large player prefers to match its
0.3 node to the other player’s 0.4. This gives a minimum cost of 1.43 for the large
player. As both players can keep switching positions forever, the game never reaches
an equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Determining whether a GCG has a Nash Equilibrium is NP-Complete.
Proof. Consider some instance of the 3-SAT problem, with m clauses and n variables
as given below:
φ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm
Ck = lk1 ∨ lk2 ∨ lk3
, where
lki ∈ {xj,¬xj}
xj ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}
Then construct a GCG corresponding to the 3-SAT problem as follows (Figure
4·3 illustrates this construction).
Consider a set of m + 1 task graphs of the form ǫ → α, such that α > 1/2 and
ǫ < (1−α)/m. There is also a second set of tasks of the form δ → 1 with δ = 1−mǫ.
For this collection of task graphs, it is only feasible to share allocations for ǫ nodes.
Consider a hosting graph with n pairs of nodes xj and ¬xj, with pairs of edges
xj → ¬xj and ¬xj → xj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, corresponding to the variables of the 3-SAT
problem. The graph also has m nodes Ck, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, corresponding to the
clauses of the 3-SAT problem, as well as an edge per clause term lki connecting each
of the variables xj and ¬xj in a clause to the corresponding Ck node. By definition
of 3-SAT there will be 3m of these edges. Finally, the hosting graph includes a ring
of m + n + 2 nodes t1, t2, . . . , tm+n+2. Set the costs and capacities of all nodes and
edges to one.
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Figure 4·3: Construction used in proof of theorem 2.
Claim: If the 3-SAT problem instance is satisfiable, then there is a NE for the
corresponding Colocation Game; otherwise there is no NE.
First, consider the case when the 3-SAT problem is satisfiable. Assign the GCG
tasks as follows: There is at least one lki edge used in the true assignment per clause.
Place an (ǫ→ α) task from the variable node, to the corresponding clause node. Map
the n (δ → 1) tasks to the n pairs of (xj ↔ ¬xj) nodes by matching the ǫ nodes to
the δ nodes. Because 3-SAT is satisfiable, this assigns all the δ → 1 tasks and m of
the ǫ→ α tasks. Place the last (ǫ→ α) edge in the ring. This configuration is a NE
as there is no task with an alternative cost-reducing position.
Now consider the case when the 3-SAT problem is unsatisfiable. From the previ-
ous ring example, no configuration with more than one (ǫ→ α) tasks in the ring is
stable. So, place one in the ring and try to place the others outside. It is possible to
place n on the edges (xj → ¬xj), but still would have m to place elsewhere. Because
3-SAT is not satisfiable, there are less than m edges lki → Ck and at least has to be
placed in the ring, giving a configuration with no equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium of PCG: Let P = (. . . , pi = Pi/Ui, . . . , pm) be the vector of
ratios of prices to utilizations for all resources. In addition, let L(P ) be the sorting
function L(P ) = (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(m)), whose image is the vector or sorted components
of P , i.e., p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(m). Consider the evolution of L(P ) as a result of
making a valid move. In particular, define P the vector before the move, and P ′
the vector after the move. The following lemma shows that the succession of vectors
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L(P ) is lexicographically ordered.
Lemma 3. In a PCG, the ordered vector of unclaimed spaces after a valid move
dominates the previous vector: L(P ′) < L(P ), where domination implies that there
exists k such that p′(i) ≤ p(i) for all i = 1 . . . k, with strict inequality for k, p′(k) < p(k).




. . . ,
Pa
Ua
, . . .
)
and L(P ′) =
(
. . . ,
Pb
U ′b
, . . .
)
By (4.5) it is the case that Pb/U
′
b < Pa/Ua, which implies that Pb/U
′
b will be either
in the same position, or if it becomes smaller than one of the predecessors of Pa/Ua,
it will move to the left. In either case, the element Pb/U
′
b is strictly less than the cor-
responding element of L(P ), and all other predecessors remain unchanged, therefore
L(P ′) dominates L(P ).
Theorem 3. PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium under better response dynamics.
Proof. Lemma 3 defines a partial order in the set of vectors of price ratios. This
partial order has one or more minimal elements7 and therefore the sequence of moves
has to stop before, or at most when it reaches one of these minima.
Since PCG’s NE may not yield the optimal packing, it might be useful to know
the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e. the ratio of the worst-case cost at equilibrium
to the social cost of an optimal solution. Figure 4·4 illustrates two examples, the
first one for homogeneous resources and the second one for heterogeneous resources.
Both examples are NE but the equilibria are not optimal. In the example of part a)
all the resources have capacity one, the top configuration is a NE and the bottom
configuration is optimal (OPT). The large processes have utilizations (weights) 1/2 <
l ≤ 2/3− 2e/3, so they cannot be colocated. The small processes have size s = 2e/3
and there are 1/e ≥ 8 of them. So the utilization when they are all in the same bin is
2/3. Individually, none will move with the large objects, as this does not reduce their
7the minimal element of the lattice associated with this partial order is the vector corresponding
to the minimum-cost bin-packing of all the tasks
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(a) homogeneous (b) heterogeneous
Figure 4·4: Examples illustrating PoA for PCG
cost, but when they all move with the large objects as in the bottom configuration,
the cost of all players reduces and the social cost is minimum.
Theorem 4. The price of anarchy for homogeneous PCG is 3/2 while the price of
the anarchy for heterogeneous PCG is 2.
Proof. Assuming resources of equal price and capacity (all normalized to 1), a lower
bound for an optimal colocation is the summation of all process utilizations, and an




ti ≤ OPT ≤ n (4.9)
The PCG construction in figure 4·4(a)-bottom exemplifies a tight optimal colocation.
First, observe that if there were more resources with processes of utilization
1/2 < l ≤ 2/3−2e/3, then the cost ratio between NE and OPT would be (|L|+1)/|L|,
where |L| is the number of “large” processes. This ratio is maximized when |L| = 2.
Alternatively, consider the case where there are more resources with low-utilization
processes. This situation would not be an equilibrium as any process with utilization
ti in bin A would benefit by moving to bin B whenever UB + ti ≥ UA. Therefore,
the equilibrium would occur when all low-utilization processes have filled as much
as possible some of the resources. In the worst case, it would have been possible to
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split such processes into two bins, with one large process of size 1/2+ ǫ in each. This
implies that a worst-case cost ratio of 3/2 between NE and OPT.
As for the case where resources have non-uniform capacities, the PoA can be
bounded, as illustrated by the example in Figure 4·4(b). This example shows a NE
with cost n, where the optimal configuration has cost n(1/2+ǫ), so this gives a lower
bound Ω(2). Now, by contradiction assume an arbitrary collection of tasks such that
∑
ti > n/2 and whose PoA is greater than 2. By the definition of PoA and using
(4.9) this would imply n/
∑
ti > 2, which contradicts the fact that the initial set of
tasks has
∑
ti > n/2. Therefore 2 is a tight bound on the PoA.
It is also possible to bound the number of moves it takes for the Colocation Game
to reach a NE in the homogeneous case, as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 5. When having a minimum threshold for executing a move, the PCG
converges to a NE in O(n2) iterations.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality unitary capacities and prices. Let V be the
vector of unclaimed spaces
V = 1n − U = (v1, . . . , vn)
then consider the following potential function
φ(V ) = v(1) + . . . + nv(n) (4.10)
where n is the number of resources, and v(i) are the components of L(V ). Define also
the minimum allowed improvement ε as the threshold in the decrease of unclaimed
space necessary to make a move. If the change is below this threshold, the move will
not be performed, as the gain for the user is negligible. Then, when an object moves
from j to i, the potential of resource i decreases by at least ε(n − i + 1) and the
potential of j increases at least by ε(n− j +1). The minimum change in potential is
∆φ(V ) = ε(n− i + 1)− ε(n− j + 1)
= ε(i− j)
which is minimal when moving between adjacent resources, in which case is ε.
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At the beginning the potential is at most










An upper bound on the number of moves m would then be the number of moves to


















Now consider multidimensional PCG: According to (4.8), valid moves are defined
by the ratios of price to utilization of the resources (a scalar quantity). Consequently,
the exact same construction used for the unidimensional case describes the dynamics
of price ratios vector for multidimensional PCG, yielding the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Multidimensional PCG converges to a Nash equilibrium under better
response dynamics.
Lower-bounding the worst-case cost paid by a player: As defined before,





The worst-case for a player is when there is only one user (Figure 4·5a) and in
this case the cost is P . The best case is when the player only has to pay for its
portion of the volume, and the volume taken by other players is maximum (Figure
4·5b). In this case the player has to pay






Figure 4·5: Worst and best cases for a player’s cost













In the continuous case it is unbounded, but considering a discrete representation of
b-bits along each dimension, with a minimum permissible allocation of 1 unit, and
a resource capacity along each dimension of 2b − 1, then the worst case ratio for d









= 1 + O(2bd) (4.12)
A practical consideration resulting from this analysis is that given the heterogene-
ity of the resources and of the task sizes, using a large number of bits to represent
capacities and demands would severely hurt the worst-case cost for a player. In-
stead, subdividing the resources into classes and assigning tasks to the smallest class
that can accommodate it, makes it is possible to use a reduced number of bits per
class. This subdivision also makes sense from the point of view of the cloud-resource
provider, as it is common to acquire machines in homogeneous batches, with each
batch belonging to different hardware generations whose capacity typically increases
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with improved technology. Having various classes of homogeneous resources also
brings the additional benefit that the price-of-anarchy is smaller compared to the
case with heterogeneous resources.
To conclude this section, some equilibrium results for PPCG are presented.
Theorem 7. On the one hand, PPCG with uniform processes converges to a NE
under better response dynamics. On the other hand, better response dynamics for
PPCG with non-uniform processes may cycle.8
Proof. In uniform PPCG, consider a better response of task Ti. Since all of Ti’s node
utilizations are the same, and since one cannot colocate any pair of these nodes on
the same hosting node, the better response of Ti can be realized by a sequence of
moves involving only one node. Therefore, by applying the same potential function
as in Lemma 3 and Theorem 3 it is possible to conclude that the better response




The implementation of PCG requires the development of two sets of services. The
first would support strategic (decision-making) functionalities for the players, whereas
the second would support operational functionalities of the system. These services
can be implemented as two autonomous agents: a user agent implements the per-
user functionality and a server agent implements the server-side functionality. Both
classes of agents rely on a global distributed directory. Server agents register them-
selves in the directory and user agents query the directory to find one or more servers
when needed. During the strategic phase, the user agent’s interaction is the follow-
ing: Pick a server from the server directory, contact the corresponding server agent
and submit the user’s bid, which contains the request vector Xi. The server agent
8This theorem can be extended to the multidimensional version of PPCG.
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accepts the bid if it is a valid move (as defined in 4.8) and informs the user agent of
the result. The user agent is free to repeat this process as many times as desired,
and by the convergence property of PCG (Theorem 3) this process will reach a NE
in at most O(n2) interactions (Theorem 5). Replacement moves are implemented
by the server agent by informing the user agent that its bid has been superceded.
At this point it is up to the user agent to bid again on another server. An accepted
bid implies a commitment by the user agent to make a payment for its fair share
of the server according to the cost function (4.7). Clearly, the bidding process must
implement a secure protocol to authenticate users and enforce the commitments to
pay. This also ensures that the user agent only has one active bid at any point in
time as multiple bids would result in multiple payments.
Operationally, at the start of an epoch, it may be necessary to reconfigure the
system to be consistent with a new colocation configuration. This requires the mi-
gration of a subset of the user processes from one set of cloud resources to another.
Notice that this migration does not involve strategic choices by the players (i.e., it is
not a game), but rather a decentralized optimization [HHK+01], whereby it is benefi-
cial to all constituents if the transition is done in the most efficient manner, and also
if its execution does not impose significant (or even measurable) degradation in the
service delivered to cloud users. This is an example of an operational service, remi-
niscent of the live migration problems for virtual machines [CFH+05] (e.g., VMware’s
VMotion and Xen live migration).9 Other operational services would include typical
metering, accounting, and policing services.
9Notice that separating the strategic and operational aspects of the implementation allows us
to avoid the redundant (and potentially very expensive) migrations resulting from a “literal” im-
plementation of a move in PCG.
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4.3.2 Better Response Heuristics
A practical distributed implementation of the Colocation Game should rely only
on local information available to the user agent and a polynomial algorithm for
computing its better response. When a user agent is about to make a move, it queries
the distributed directory to get a random server pointer. It submits its request vector
Xi to the corresponding server agent. If adding the process to the resource results in
a cost reduction, then the server replies accepting the bid. This produces a placement
move. On the other hand, if adding the process is not feasible, it may be still the case
that a subset of the other processes along with the one making the bid results in a
lower cost to all the members of the set, resulting in a replacement move. Determining
if such subset exists corresponds to solving a knapsack problem [CLRS01]: Find the
subset of processes that maximizes the utilization of this resource. If a cost-reducing
solution is found, the replacement move is executed, otherwise the process has to
wait until its next turn to try again.10
The knapsack problem itself is NP-complete, but there is a dynamic programming
algorithm for solving it in pseudo-polynomial time for reasonable size instances.
Given that in practice the number of processes assigned to a resource is unlikely to
exceed a few hundreds, the Dynamic Programming solution of the Knapsack Problem
(DPKP) would be tractable. In addition to DPKP, other branch & bound techniques
using either breadth-first search (BFS) or depth-first search (DFS) are considered.
Branch & Bound BFS and DFS limit the degree and the depth of the search to limit
the amount of time spent finding a better response. The remainder of this section
discusses the details about DPKP, BFS, and DFS as well as the local better-response
strategy.
10To reduce the total number of moves, processes may adopt a cost threshold heuristic, whereby
a process will only adopt a move if the resulting cost improvement is at least p% of its current cost
(or is at least some fixed absolute threshold).
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Dynamic Programming Solution of the Knapsack Problem (DPKP)
With reference to equation (4.8), notice that the problem of minimizing the cost
incurred by a task for packing its process in a resource reduces to the problem of
maxizing U ′b, or equivalently minimizing the slack (unused capacity) of a resource.
For this analysis, define a workload as a set of tasks (processes) W = {Tk, . . .},
and the slack as s(W ) = R −
∑
Ti∈W
Ti, where R is the capacity vector of the
resource. The quantity to minimize is the volume of the slack v(W ) =
∏
s(W ). For
the construction of the dynamic programming solution, assume that demands and
capacities are discrete b-bits quantities, in a d-dimensional space. This implies that
there are 2b values per dimension, yielding a total of 2bd discrete volumes.
The key observation in defining DPKP is that the best solution that includes
task Ti is the union of {Ti} and the best solution for the resource of capacity R−Ti.
Considering one additional task at a time, it may be the case that either the best
solution for some capacity R is the same as when considering only tasks T1, . . . , Ti−1,
or the alternative solution for R − Ti union {Ti}. Therefore the overhead of the
optimal solution can be computed using the recurrence:
A(i, j) = min
{
A(i− 1, j), v(W(i−1,k) ∪ Ti)
}
(4.13)
where the column indexes (j, k) are over an enumeration of the capacity vectors
whose increments are the discrete capacity steps, so in (4.13), k is the index of the
column corresponding to the capacity of column j minus task Ti:
k = column(Rj − Ti)
As a boundary condition, for cases where Rj − Ti ≤ 0 on any of its dimensions, the
cost is ∞, same for A(0, j). Observe that the rows need not be ordered. All what
is needed when computing row i is to have all the values of row i − 1. Therefore
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function searchBetterMove(Set of tasks T)
A(0,:) = Infinity
tasksPerColumn(0,:) = {empty}
maxColumn = 2^(b*d) // Bits times Dimensions
foreach i in T




cost = volumen( tasksPerColumn(0,k) Union i )
if cost<A(0,j)









Figure 4·6: Pseudocode for the DPKP Better Response Algorithm
the space requirement is limited to keeping in memory the current and the previous
rows. If there are d dimensions and b bits per dimension, the total space required
is O(2bd). As for time complexity, the algorithm finishes when it reaches the last
column of the last row, therefore if m is the number of tasks, the time is O(m2bd).
This solution suffers from the curse of dimensionality for large values of d or for high
granularities. Figure 4·6 gives the pseudocode of DKPD.
Branch and Bound Better Response Heuristics
Figure 4·7 shows the pseudo-code for the branch-and-bound better-response heuris-
tic. It takes two parameters degree and maxDepth that limit the portion of the
search space explored. If the process fits in the given resource, the algorithm returns
immediately. Otherwise, the algorithm searches for the minimal set of tasks that
need to be replaced in order for the new task to fit. In this pseudocode, list is a data
structure that may be implemented as a FIFO queue to give a BFS search, or as a
LIFO queue to give a DFS search. The algorithm keeps track of the best solution
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found so far, and when it is done (either because it was able to explore the full
search space or because it reached the bounds established by degree and maxDepth)
it returns its current best solution.
Local Better-Response Procedure
This section summarizes the complete procedure for a process to find a better-
response move using any of the previous techniques to solve to the subjacent knap-
sack problem. Let k denote the process whose turn it is to make a better-response
move. Let P0 and U0 be the price and utilization of the resource to which player k
is currently assigned.
1. Player k randomly picks a resource j of capacity Rj and price Pj. Let Vj denote
the set of tasks currently assigned to resource j.
2. Let S ⊆ Vj be the solution of the knapsack problem (obtained using any one
of the approaches presented above), where the knapsack capacity is Rj − Xk

















The first condition for a valid move is the feasibility condition, which is implicit
in any knapsack solution. The second condition underscores the total utiliza-
tion increase, assuring that the cost of the tasks that will remain assigned to
resource j will decrease. The third condition is the cost reduction for player k.
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// Move found no task needs to be replaced
return tasksToReplace
for i=1 to degree







bestSolution = search(list, T, R)
if (bestSolution != null)
tasksToReplace = set of tasks in the chain from
bestSolution to the root
return tasksToReplace
else
return "no better move found"
endif
endfunction
function search(list, T, R)
bestCost = infinity
bestSolution = null
while( ! list.isEmpty() )
node = list.remove()
newVolume = R.sumVolume() - node.sumVolume + T.volume()
newCost = R.price()*T.volume()/newVolume






for i=1 to degree














Figure 4·7: Pseudocode for the Branch-and-Bound Better-Response Heuristics
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3. If player k is able to identify a valid move, then it replaces the set of tasks
Vj \ S on resource j.
11
4.4 PCG: Experimental Evaluation
To explore the potential from using colocation games as the underlying mechanism
for enabling rational, selfish users to make cost-effective use of a distributed infras-
tructure available through an independent provider who has no economic incentive
to do so, this section presents a summary of a series of experiments for variants of
the process colocation game, which are natural candidates for resource management
in distributed/cloud computing environments.
Data Sets and PCG Variants: These experiments were conducted using both,
synthetically-generated, and trace-driven (PlanetLab) workloads. For each one of
them, the unidimensional and multidimensional variants of PCG were simulated
under both a homogeneous and heterogeneous resource pool.
The synthetic workloads give the flexibility of varying the number of resources,
number of tasks, and dimensionality. More importantly, they make it possible to
experiment with workloads for which the socially-optimal solution is known. This
is done by repeatedly fragmenting the full capacities of a set of resources and then
using the resulting fragments as a representation of the utilization (demand) of a set
of tasks. By construction, it is known that a “perfect” colocation exists (with every
resource being fully utilized). As the initial configuration for the experiment, the
resulting tasks are scrambled in a much larger set of resources.
The trace-driven workloads were constructed using publicly available PlanetLab
traces of CoMon [PP06, web]. These traces contain snapshots of PlanetLab server
11As a result of a replacement move, the set of replaced tasks (Vj\S) are assigned to a new (empty)
resource. This will necessarily increase their costs, possibly triggering these tasks to execute their
own better-response moves later on.
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capacities as well as the utilization of the slices assigned to the various tasks colocated
on each server. The main advantage of this dataset is that it gives the distribution
of a set of real task utilizations on a fairly large scale. Its disadvantage is that one
cannot compare the configurations resulting from the colocation game to socially-
optimal configurations – the latter being infeasible to compute due to PlanetLab’s
scale. Thus for these workloads, the worst/best cost ratios resulting for a series of
runs of the same game instance are reported. In PlanetLab, server capacities as
well as slice utilizations (corresponding to the utilizations of a slice’s CPU, mem-
ory, uplink, and downlink) are multidimensional. This makes PlanetLab an example
of an infrastructure on top of which a multidimensional PCG game may be imple-
mented. As with synthetic workloads, the PlanetLab experiments considered both
homogeneous and heterogeneous resource models.
Player Response: As computation of a player’s best response is an NP-complete
problem, the experiments compare the various solution techniques from Section 4.3,
namely: (1) A dynamic-programming knapsack solution (DPKP), (2) A depth-first
search (DFS) with branch-and-bound pruning, and (3) a breadth-first search (BFS)
also with branch-and-bound pruning.
Metrics: The metrics used to characterize the PCG game dynamics were: (1)
the colocation ratio which is defined to be the ratio of average/optimal social cost
(for synthetic workloads) and of worst/best social cost (for trace-driven workloads);
(2) the total number of move trials until an equilibrium is reached; and (3) the
total number of actual moves until an equilibrium is reached. The colocation ratio
characterizes the (in)efficiency of the colocation resulting from playing the game,
and is bounded by the PoA, as derived analytically for unidimensional PCG. The
number of trials gives an insight on the total time it takes for the game to reach an
equilibrium.
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To compute all three metrics, the game runs until the system reaches an equilib-
rium. Because of the heuristic solution to the better response problem, this equilib-
rium is not necessarily a NE, but a relaxed notion of equilibrium where no player was
able to find a better response with bounded computational resources. The metrics
reported in the experiments below correspond to this equilibrium.
Colocation Efficiency for Synthetic Workloads: Figure 4·8 shows the median
(over 100 samples) of the colocation ratios for synthetically-generated workloads
in both homogeneous and heterogeneous settings. Recall that in a homogeneous
(heterogeneous) setting all resources are (not) of equal capacities. These results
show that the PoA (of 3/2 for homogeneous cases and 2 for heterogeneous cases) for
the colocation for most cases. A few exceptions registered in the worst-case plots are
attributed to the approximate better-response computation and to the threshold for
detecting an equilibrium.
The results in Figure 4·8 show that the colocation ratio tends to decrease (i.e.,
better efficiency) as the number of players increases, which bodes well for large-
scale deployments. Also, these results show that colocation efficiency was basically
independent of the better-response heuristic in use. It is noteworthy to mention that
the branch-and-bound BFS and DFS heuristics were much faster than the dynamic
programming (DPKP) heuristic. Indeed, DPKP was not able to handle many of the
3D and PlanetLab instances of PCG (hence the omitted DPKP results in Figure 4·8
for 3D cases).
Comparing the results for homogeneous versus heterogeneous settings, note that
the median colocation ratio in the latter setting was only slightly larger.
Colocation Ratio for PlanetLab Workloads: Figure 4·9 shows the median
colocation ratio (ratio of worst/best social cost) using the task specifications derived
from the PlanetLab traces. These results imply a relatively small colocation ratio,
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Figure 4·8: Colocation ratio for synthetic workloads.
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Figure 4·9: Colocation ratio for PlanetLab workloads.
which as with synthetic workloads seems to be independent of the better response
heuristic used. As shown in Figure 4·9, the worst-case colocation ratios were not too
far off.12
Convergence Speed and Overhead: Figures 4·10 and 4·11 show the number of
moves it takes to reach equilibrium. They indicate that the number of moves is
directly related to the number of tasks in the system and fairly independent by the
heuristic used to compute the better response. The relation is essentially linear for
unidimensional PCG and follows a power law for higher dimensionality PCGs.
Figures 4·12 and 4·13 show the number of trials to reach equilibrium. Similar
to the number of moves, the number of trials follows a power law dependent on the
dimensionality of the problem, almost linear for 1D settings.
12Note that the abundance of small tasks in the trace significantly improve the chances of achiev-
ing better placements.
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Figure 4·11: Number of moves for PlanetLab workloads.
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Figure 4·13: Number of trials for PlanetLab workloads.
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Another question explored experimentally was the problem of assigning turns to
the players. Various heuristics were explored: 1) random, chooses the player who is
going to make the trials uniformly at random, 2) round-robin, all players go around
taking turns, and 3) worst-colocated first, players who are currently paying higher
overhead costs get more chances to move. To evaluate the effect of the selection
heuristic on the convergence dynamics, figures 4·14 and 4·15 show the number of
moves and trials under the various strategies. In general the effect is minimal sug-
gesting that the convergence speed is independent of the selection policy.
4.5 Related Word
4.5.1 Resource Allocation Using Micro-economic Mechanisms
When multiple users compete for a set of resources, the question of which appli-
cations users get allocated and which applications users get denied (or postponed)
arises. Auctions are a micro-economic mechanism that handles this question on the
assumption that there is an authority running the auction and enforcing its outcome.
One concrete example where auctions are being used is Bellagio [ACSV04], which
specifically uses a combinatorial auction mechanism with the goal of maximizing
the social utility (the sum of the utilities for the users who get resources allocated).
Users express their valuations for different sets of resources (e.g. the various map-
pings found by SWORD) in for form of bids. One particularly interesting auction
mechanism is the VCG auction [AM04] because it maximizes the social value and
makes truthful bidding a dominant strategy. The VCG mechanism has its limita-
tions though [San96]: it is not budget balanced, it is susceptible to collusion and
the implicit WDP is NP-Hard. Instead, Bellagio relies on a thresholding auction
mechanism called SHARE [CNA+04] for clearing the auction. In order to enforce
the outcome of the allocation mechanism (the auction or any other) in a distributed
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Figure 4·14: BFS & DFS Median number of Moves – Synthetic dataset
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Figure 4·15: DPKP Median number of Moves – Synthetic dataset
and federated environment, where the management of the resources available at each
site resides with the site’s administrators, a secure delegation mechanism is required.
SHARP [FCC+03] is an example of a mechanism that provides this functionality.
Practical experience with auction-based mechanisms has revealed other vulner-
abilities in the form of user behaviors that manipulate the outcome of the auction.
In particular AuYoung et al [ABC+09] point out the following ones:
1. Underbidding: when users know that the overall demand is low they can drive
the prices down.
2. Iterative bidding: users keep changing their bids, which may lead to a never
ending bidding process, or make the auction take too long, which is problematic
when resources are perishable (remaining idle).
3. Rolling window manipulation: when users may bid for resources at various
points in time. It may result in starvation of some users and suboptimality in
the utility of the system over time.
4. Auction sandwich attack: may occur when users are allowed to bid for resources
at different points in time. Given limited information, the system computes a
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locally optimal solution, which may differ from the global optimal were all the
requests known at the beginning.
Another example of a system to handle the allocation for multiple users is Tycoon
[LRA+05]. In this case the assumption is that resources are shared under a best-effort
model and each user should be allocated resources in a proportionally fair manner.
Resources are federated in the sense that allocation decisions are local to each one
of the resources, thus avoiding the combinatorial nature of the WDP, at the expense
of giving up optimality. In this system users place bids on the different resources
they need. The fraction of resource allocated to one user is the proportional share
according to the total bids in the system. For this reason it is a best-effort system:
there is no guarantee applications will receive some desired fraction of the resources.
The bidding process is continuous in the sense that any user may modify/withdraw
its bid at any point in time, and the allocation for all the users is adjusted according
to the new bid-to-total ratios. Users have finite budgets,, therefore their best strategy
is to maximize their utility (a linear combination of the utilities derived from each
resource) subject to the available budget.
4.5.2 Resource Allocation Using Game-Theoretic Mechanisms
Suri et al [STZ04] present an analysis of P2P system where users follow a selfish
strategy to establish connections to peers. This analysis models the system using a
congestion-game where the time to complete a transfer increases as the load on a
peer increases. Their analysis shows the existence of NE and gives bounds on the
PoA for both, the case of all peers having the same speed, and the case of peers with
heterogeneous speeds.
The formation of overlays between selfish peers is a problem of interest in P2P
applications. For example Laoutaris et al [LSBB07] make a characterization of the
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resulting overlays when the peers selfishly minimize the cost of reaching all other
nodes in the network.
The work by Chen and Roughgarden [CR06] is the closest in spirit to the Coloca-
tion Games. In this work, the goal is to allocate source-destination flows on a shared
network. Each flow has a weight and the cost of the link if slit in proportion to the
ratio between the weight of a flow and the total weights of the flows sharing the link.
This work shows that NE does not always exist, but approximated NE13 does exist.
4.6 Summary
Service providers will do what is within their capabilities to optimize the operation
of their services, generally meaning to maximize their utility.14 However, when the
service providers are bound by SLAs or the granularity of their reservations is coarse,
this creates the opportunity for users to look for alternatives that optimize their own
benefit, which is the situation modeled by the Colocation Game.
Assuming a generic cost-sharing model (the Shapley cost), it was shown that
GCG, the most general case of the Colocation Game, best-response dynamics do not
always converge to a NE, and determining if a NE exists is an NP-Complete problem.
In practical terms this is a negative result as for any given workload (collection of
user applications) not reaching an equilibrium means that the system will spend its
time readjusting to the user’s requests to change their mappings in response to the
changes made by other users, all of which is overhead for the system.
This chapter also considered several special cases for which it was shown that
NE always exists: the Process Colocation Game (PCG), the Multidimensional Pro-
13A configuration is an α-approximate NE if no player can reduce its cost by more than an α
multiplicative factor.
14Taking the utility in a very general sense, and not necessarily meaning the revenue for the
provider. For example non-for-profit infrastructures such as Emulab, PlanetLab, and Mirage look
forward optimizing the value of the testbed for their users, rather than maximizing their profit.
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cess Colocation Game (MPCG), and the homogeneous Parallel Process Colocation
Game (PPCG). Even though they are much simplified versions, there are practical
applications for which they constitute a feasible resource management framework,
where allocation decisions are delegated to the end-users, can be easily implemented
in distributed and federated environment, and extend to online settings, where ap-
plications may arrive and leave over time and the system readjusts itself to until it
reaches a new NE. It was also shown that the PoA of using the game as an allocation
system is bounded and in fact competitive with the approximation ratio for the bin-
packing problem, meaning that the allocation decided by the game is comparable to
what could be obtained by a centralized approximated solution. Extensive experi-
mental evaluation showed that in fact this upper bound is rarely reached, meaning
that in practice the colocation ratio is much less than the PoA. This is the case espe-
cially when the number of users is not very small – exactly the scenario expected on
large infrastructures where many users (in the other of hundreds for typical testbeds,
and much larger for Cloud service providers) share the infrastructure.
92
Chapter 5
The Trade & Cap Marketplace:
Incentives for Load-Balancing
The network embedding problems studied in chapters 3 and 4 emphasized the spatial
resource mapping considerations, meaning that all the resources were to be assigned
at the same time, to be used by the applications over the same time interval. On the
other end of the spectrum are problems, where the goal is to control the temporal
allocation of resources. Doing so is important in many practical cases, exemplified
below:
1. For Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, the efficiency of datacenters
is heavily dependent on the utilization level [BH09, GHMP09]. For example,
Amazon’s recently introduced EC2 Spot Instances [Ama09] service tackles this
problem by introducing a supply-and-demand driven pricing so that “elastic
instances” (those who are flexible about when they can be run) get an incentive
to fill in underutilized periods and reduce the pressure on periods of high
demand.
2. When a set of network users share a common link, as is the case for broadband
users connected to the same ISP, or the users within an enterprise/campus
sharing a dedicated access link, the performance of each application is heavily
dependent on the utilization level of the common link. For example, queueing
delay increases rapidly with the utilization level and adds to the response
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time observed by end users. The normal practice is for users to execute their
network tasks immediately, which translates into high variability of network
utilization and poor performance during periods of high utilization. It has
been pointed out [LR08, LSRS09] that there are applications that need not
to be executed right away, but can be perfectly executed at a later time, as
for example P2P file transfers, network backups, and bulk data transfers. For
this reason they are called Delay-Tolerant (DT) and significant savings can be
obtained by scheduling their execution appropriately. In fact this has been
done in [LR08, LSRS09] when all the tasks are under the control of a central
authority, leading to a single objective optimization problem.
The first example above illustrates the usage of an explicit incentive mechanism
in the pricing model: Users with DT tasks prefer to schedule their tasks when prices
are low. The second example illustrates the main challenge addressed in this chapter:
How to provide the right incentives so that users sharing a common resource schedule
their DT tasks during the periods of low utilization given a pricing system does not
provide such incentives. The later situation occurs often in practice, for example
when using flat-rate payment models (commonly done by ISPs, enterprise, campus
networks – for the last ones the flat-rate has value zero) there is no explicit incentive
to postpone the execution of DT tasks. Even more, flat-rate pricing schemes are be-
coming the standard for end-users in telecommunications services [Odl01], precluding
changes to the pricing model as the means to create the incentive mechanism.
Other challenges that arise in the design of a mechanism for this problem are:
• There should be a notion of fairness between the users of the system. Notions
of fairness commonly used in networking, such as max-min fairness or propor-
tional fairness are not appropriate for this problem as they refer to the instanta-
neous rates of the flows sharing the link, without regard to the user/application
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they belong to. Briscoe [Bri07] points out (among many other drawbacks) that
these per-flow metrics are easy to bypass simply by having multiple concurrent
flows.
• The system should not rely on establishing valuations of individual tasks. A
valuation is a quantitative measure of how much is a task worth for the user,
and therefore is a commonly used parameter in many micro-economic mecha-
nisms such as auctions. The problem as pointed out by Briscoe [Bri07] is that
valuations are usually unknown or subjective, and even if known they would
be impractical to communicate to the system.
• The system should not impose policies that violate the principle of “network
neutrality” [Cro07]. Many ISPs have deployed systems to filter traffic based on
the application. These mechanisms exclude legitimate uses of the network, are
opposed to the openness nature of the Internet and could potentially be used
for monopolizing certain services (for example an ISP blocking voice services
to monopolize the voice market on his network). Many of these mechanisms
depend on Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) techniques, which raises many pri-
vacy concerns and its long-term scalability is not clear as traffic grows and
applications easily adapt to bypass them, for example using packet encryption
and randomization of port numbers.
• The operation of the system should be as transparent as possible to the users.
Ideally the user should not get involved in the operational aspects of the system,
for example in doing any scheduling decision.
This chapter presents Trade & Cap, a marketplace-inspired mechanism that
solves this problem and addresses all of the above mentioned challenges. This mech-
anism does not rely on real currency, but instead uses the qualities of different classes
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of traffic as a virtual currency to enable the users to trade allocations in the market-
place. Section 5.1 describes the general scenario used by the marketplace mechanism,
and although the examples refer to a shared network link as the contended resource,
it should be pointed out that it is equally applicable to schedule other types of re-
sources as well. Section 5.2 gives the model definition used by the different variants
of the marketplace presented in this chapter. Section 5.3 presents gives the analytical
description of the marketplace framework for the case of non-elastic or fluid applica-
tions, i.e. applications whose utility is continuous and strictly increasing as function
of the total allocation. Next, Section 5.4 extends the previous results for the case
of inelastic or atomic tasks. It is shown that under certain restrictions the system
is guaranteed to reach a Nash Equilibrium and bounds on the Price of Anarchy are
established. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 consider the operation of the marketplace when
there is a single type of tasks, either fluid or atomic. In Section 5.5, it is shown
that both schemes can be implemented together resulting in general version of the
T&C marketplace. Section 5.6 describes a prototype implementation of the sys-
tem build around the Hierarchical Token Bucket (HTB) network scheduler included
in the Linux kernel. This implementation supports both fluid/atomic allocations
and meets the neutrality requirement by placing all classification decisions on the
client side of the service. Finally, Section 5.7 presents an experimental evaluation of
the marketplace mechanism performed on real network traces, thus illustrating the
benefits of the system under realistic conditions.
5.1 Application Scenario for Trade & Cap
Figure 5·1 illustrates the main application scenario used throughout this chapter.
In this example there is a single bottleneck link and a set of users sharing it. This
abstracts cases in which a set of subscribers to an ISP share the ISP’s outgoing link, or
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cases where users within an enterprise/campus network share a common uplink, etc.
Commonly in these scenarios it is the case that there is no cooperation between the
users, they simple execute their tasks (access web pages, checking e-mail, streaming
media, downloads, backups) without regard/knowledge of other tasks being executed
at the same time. In this scenario the sharing occurs at the edge of the network and
the common access link (or a link on the path) is the bottleneck – i.e., it is assumed
that the core of the network is well provisioned and that its impact on QoS is small.
Figure 5·1: A BW sharing installation.
As a result of the lack of coordination between the users, the following negative
effects are inevitable:
1. Delay sensitive applications (such as VoIP, video streaming, web browsing)
suffer poor performance during periods of high utilization.
2. Operators incur high cost for the contended resource. This is frequently the
case for ISPs and enterprise networks, whose cost is determined using the 95/5
rule, that sets the service charge based on the 95-percentile of the distribution
of the 5-min traffic aggregates.
3. As the activity periods exhibit some diurnal patterns [MFPA09], the resource
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goes over cycles of under/over-utilization. To ensure good performance during
the periods high demand, the shared link must be over-provisioned, requiring
significant investments in infrastructure.
5.2 Model Definitions
The system model assumes that the bandwidth consumption profile for each user
follows some characteristic pattern – e.g., the typical diurnal traffic pattern which is
made up of the two constituents Interactive Traffic (IT) and Delay-Tolerant (DT). IT
refers in general to the traffic due to applications that are delay sensitive (irrespective
of their bandwidth requirement) such as VoIP, audio/video streaming, web-browsing,
ssh sessions, etc. DT is due to applications that are not sensitive to delay, and
have not stringent deadlines. It is assumed that DT applications benefit by having
as much bandwidth as possible. Some examples of DT are replication/mirroring
services, network backups, P2P file transfers, etc.
In the system’s model, time is quantized into time slots. A sequence of T con-
secutive time slots constitutes an allocation epoch. The IT pattern of each user is
given by a vector (xi1, . . . , xiT ), where xij denotes the estimated IT demand for user
i during time slot j. Note that the granularity of the time slots is inconsequential
for the system.1 The experimental evaluation presented later uses 5min time slots,
mirroring the granularity that is typically used for network monitoring/accounting
purposes. The characterization of IT using the vector (. . . , xij, . . .) is meant to pro-
vide an estimate of future demand, and thus does not need to be exact. Furthermore,
in order to provide a safety margin, the system enforces a minimum allocation per
time slot, so that xij ≥ xmin for a configurable value of xmin. Similarly, the DT is
described by a vector (. . . , wij, . . .), whose components wij denote the allocation of
1The system is concerned with long-term bandwidth management; it is not intended to operate
at the time-scales of round-trip-times, but rather at time-scales that are orders of magnitude larger.
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DT for user i at time slot j.
Users derive some utility through the satisfaction of their demands of both IT
and DT. The utility derived by a user from the realization of its IT demand vector
is assumed to be a fixed constant, whose precise value is not germane to the system.
This is a desirable feature given the documented difficulties in establishing such
a value, as discussed in this chapter’s introduction. On the other hand, and in
accordance with the notion of elasticity for the DT, the components wij are positive
real variables and the larger the sum
∑
j wij, the greater the utility derived from DT
applications. Section 5.3 describes a first version of the marketplace, where the users
only trade allocations of DT components and their IT vector is constant throughout
the allocation epoch. Section 5.4 extends the marketplace mechanism to allow users
to trade allocations of IT components, but preserving the size of each component.
For this reason this is referred to as trading of atomic components.
The trading mechanisms presented in this chapter implement a notion fairness
between the users by assigning each user a number of shares which represent their
rights for bandwidth reservation on the system. Thus, if Bi if the total shares (bud-
get) of user i, and if all the users make uniform allocations over all time slots, then Bi
is the amount of service received by user i. The budget does not need to be the same
for all users, thus allowing for tiered service models, e.g. premium/standard/basic
or prioritized service within an organization. The budget is thus used to enforce a
notion of long-term economic fairness between the users, this in accordance to the
notion of fairness suggested by Briscoe [Bri07]. A key feature of the system is that
when the demand on the time slots is not uniform, the value of the shares will not
be uniform, but will depend on the total demand per time slot. By doing this, the
system will impose a supply/demand driven valuation of the time slots, thus provid-
ing the right incentive so that users prefer to allocate DT on slots with low demand.
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This is accomplished by defining the cost (in shares) of a given allocation in a time
slot as
cij = (xij + wij) · f(Uj) (5.1)
which indicates that cij shares are needed to allocate a total bw of xij + wij in time
slot j. The function f() is a continuous, twice differentiable, convex, and strictly




i(xij + wij), being C the
capacity of the resources. This function yields a bandwidth unit cost per-slot that is
determined by the prevailing levels of supply and demand (“market”), whereby slots
with low demand are cheap, and slots with high demand are expensive. The intuition
of this product-form cost function is that it makes the time slot more expensive for
users responsible for the largest fraction of the utilization. It is the best-strategy for
the user to minimize its contribution wij on hot-spots, thus giving the incentive to
load-balance the utilization of the link.
5.3 Demand-based Trading for Fluid Traffic
The initial version of the marketplace will assume that the IT components xij are
constant and the users trade only the allocations of DT components wij. Since the
goal of an individual (rational) user is to maximize its own utility, and since the
utility of IT is constant and that of DT is positively correlated with the total volume
of DT, it follows that the objective of user i would be to find the vector (. . . , wij, . . .)










(xij + wij) · f(Uj) ≤ Bi (5.3)
wij ≥ 0 ∀j = 1 . . . T (5.4)
Solution of the per-user problem:
The per-user optimization problem can be solved using the Lagrange multipliers
technique [Sun96] as follows:






Define also the constraint functions
hiq(Wi) =
{
wiq q = 1, . . . , T
Bi −
∑T
j=1(xij + wij) · f(Uj) q = T + 1
Then the per-user optimization problem can be expressed as:
Maximize bi(Wi) subject to Wi ∈ D = {Wi ∈ R
T | hiq(Wi) ≥ 0, q = 1, . . . , T + 1}
Lemma 4. (Convexity of the feasible space D)
When the cost function f() is a continuous, twice differentiable, convex, and strictly
increasing function, the set of feasible solutions {Wi ∈ D} is convex.
Proof. Each one of the functions hiq(Wi) defines a convex set Sq as follows:
For q = 1, . . . , T , the functions hiq(Wi) = wiq are linear, therefore concave, and the
subgraph of hiq(Wi), Sq, is convex.
2










−f(Uj)− (xij + wij)
∂f(Uj)
∂wij
, . . .
]
2Refer to [Sun96] §7.1.1
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= 0 when j 6= k, and
∂2f(Uj)
∂wij∂wik
= 0 when j 6= k, then the Hessian




− (xij + wij)
∂2f(Uj)
∂w2ij
Also, for any arbitrary vector z different from zero,






where the last step uses the fact that αjj < 0 because of the assumption that f()
is twice differentiable, convex (therefore
∂2f(Uj)
∂w2ij
> 0) and strictly increasing (so that
∂f(Uj)
∂wij
> 0). Hence, the Hessian D2hi,T+1(Wi) negative definite and hi,T+1(Wi) is con-
cave (See Theorem 7.10 [Sun96]). In consequence, the subgraph ST+1 of hi,T+1(Wi)
is a convex set, and the set
D = ∩T+1q=1 Sq
is also convex (See Theorem 1.37 [Sun96]).
Having established the convexity of the feasible space, then the existence of the
maximum and the way to determine that maximum are established by the following
theorem:
Theorem 8. (Optimal solution for the per-user problem)
Given: 1) a cost function f() continuous, twice differentiable, convex and strictly
increasing, and 2) a fixed allocation xij whose cost is below the budget Bi, then there
exists a W ∗i ∈ D that maximizes bi(W
∗
i ) and a vector λ
∗ that satisfies the Khun and
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Tucker conditions for this problem.





where µj is the slot utilization when all the wij = 0, i.e. µj = Uj − wij/C. Given
that the cost function is continuous over all the variables wij, there exists a vector
W̄i = (w̄ij, . . .) such that
hiq(W̄i) > 0 , q = 1, . . . , T + 1
(this is known as Slater’s condition). Also, given that the feasible space D is a
bounded convex set, it follows that at least one of its elements maximizes bi(Wi).
The objective function bi(Wi) is a concave continuous function and the constraint
functions hiq(Wi) are also concave (which was established in the proof of Lemma 4).
As a result all the conditions of the theorem of Khun and Tucker under convexity
(Theorem 7.16 in [Sun96]) are satisfied, and the existence of a maximum W ∗i implies










i ) = 0






i ) = 0
The previous theorem constitutes a solution method for determining the per-
user best-response in a T&C marketplace of fluid allocations. The exact solution
depends on the assignment of the cost function, the following example illustrates the
case when f() is the identity function.
Example 1. Solution to the user’s optimization problem when the cost function is
f(Uj) = Uj.



















The condition KT-1 establishes that at the point Wi where bi(Wi) is maximum, there
is a vector λ such that
∂L(Wi, λ)
∂wij
= 1 + λj − λT+1
(




= 0 for j = 1, . . . , T (5.7)










By condition KT-2, the sum of the constraint functions at the optimal point, each
term weighted by its respective Lagrange multiplier is zero, and the Lagrange mul-
tipliers are greater or equal to zero. In particular the constraint function hi,T+1(Wi)
refers to the budget and this constraint is always satisfied with equality under the
conditions of the T&C market, otherwise any left over budget can always be used
to increase one or more of the wij and the point Wi would not correspond to the






Consequently and as the values wij ≥ 0 and λj ≥ 0, it must be the case that for
every j either λj = 0 or wij = 0. Solving for wij from eq. (5.7) for the cases where
λj = 0
wij =
C − λT+1(µjC + xij)
2λT+1
(5.8)














xipµp = 0 (5.9)
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The only problem left to solve this equation is determining the time slots p
such that the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are λp = 0. An iterative solution
procedure was devised as follows: 1) Remove all the constraints hiq(Wi) for q =
1, . . . , T . This is equivalent to lifting the restriction of the values wij being positive.
2) Solve the problem without these constraints. If all the values are positive, it is
also a solution to the problem with the positivity constraint. If not, mark the time
slots with negative wij as slots with λp 6= 0. Then solve again using eq. (5.10).
Observe that the exact value of λp is not required, only the knowledge of them being
zero or not.
Theorem 9. The global optimum of the user’s optimization problem is unique
Proof. Suppose it is not. Let X and Y be two distinct global maximizers of bi().
Let Z = αX + (1− α)Y for α ∈ (0, 1). By the convexity of D, it is always the case
that Z ∈ D. By the linearity of bi()
bi(Z) = αbi(X) + (1− α)bi(Y )
= bi(X)
the second step because under the conditions of Theorem 8 any maximizer of bi() is a
global maximizer. This means that all the points z in the hyperline segment defined
by X,Y are also global maximizers. The constraint hi,T+1() is strictly concave (as
shown in Lemma 4), therefore
hi,T+1(Z) > αhi,T+1(X) + (1− α)hi,T+1(Y )
Remember that hi,T+1(Z) is the left-over budget at point Z. As discussed before,
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at the optimal allocations X,Y all the budget has been used, therefore hi,T+1(X) =
hi,T+1(Y ) = 0. Having a left-over budget greater than zero at Z means that it is
possible to increase the allocations in some time slots, which would give a greater
value of bi() thus contradicting the optimality at Z.
The previous theorems related to the actions of a single user assuming the allo-
cations of the other users remain fixed. In practice, if a user changes its allocations,
the unit prices per slot (dictated by f(Uj)) change and the optimal solution for other
players also changes. It is then possible for the users of the fluid T&C marketplace
to engage in a game where each user changes its strategy (its allocation vector Wi)
in response to other users actions.
Theorem 10. If the set of mutually feasible allocations is not empty, the T&C
marketplace has a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Define the global per-slot allocations as wgj =
∑n
i=1 wij. Also define the










(xij + wij) · f(Uj) ≤ Bi for i = 1, . . . , n (5.12)
wij ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, and j = 1 . . . T (5.13)













λT+1,i(Bi − ci) (5.14)
Observe that this Laplacian is the sum of the per-user Laplacians (eq. 5.6), and
the condition [KT-1] is satisfied if and only if the per-user [KT-1] is satisfied. In
consequence, the Lagrange multiplers that solve the per-user maximization problem
(eq. 5.10) are also the ones that solve the global maximization problem. In other
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words, the vector W ∗g that maximizes (5.11) is obtained when the corresponding
per-user allocations W ∗i are optimal.
As the set of feasible allocations is not empty, one of its members maximizes (5.11)
and this point corresponds to an per-user optimal as well, therefore it is a NE.
An illustrative example:
Figure 5·2 illustrates the equilibrium solution for a case with two users that have
interactive traffic profiles that overlap during some periods (the solid line). The
dashed line is the total allocated bandwidth per user for a budget of 256kbps per
time slot. The indicated time slots T1 and T2 illustrate cases where the allocation of
DT of one user reduces to give opportunity to handle a peak of IT from the other
user. Notice that a conventional liquid filling algorithm would not achieve this result.

























Figure 5·2: Example with two users
On the Notion of Fairness: The scheme presented in this section uses a notion of
fairness different from the classical definitions of max-min fairness and proportional
fairness. In particular, these definitions compare the instantaneous rates of various
flows sharing the link. They do not take into account the number of flows per user
or when these flows are active. The T&C mechanism uses a different notion: All of
users of the shared resource pay exactly the same unit-price during any time slot.
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Users are free to allocate any amount and may choose where in time they want to
make their reservations. The unit price itself (computed as f(Uj)) is variable and
it is this variability that introduces the incentive for users with DT tasks to move
them away from the periods of high demand.
5.4 Demand-based Trading for Atomic Tasks
The previous section considered the problem when traffic can be handled as a fluid:
any positive real-valued allocation is valid. An alternative problem is when the
tasks are atomic, i.e. the task has to be executed entirely or not at all. Partial
execution has no value for the user and any partial work is only wasting system
resources. In this case the T&C marketplace can also provide the right incentives
for users to schedule their DT tasks during periods of low utilization, and at the
same time minimizing the pressure on the time slots of high demand. To maintain
the connection with the same practical example of the previous section, the atomic
tasks will be referred to as the IT components of the network activity. Interactive
tasks usually have a finite size and a deadline. For example when streaming a video,
each frame has a finite size and must be received within some limited time in order
to be ready at playback time.
To describe the possibility of re-allocating atomic tasks, it is necessary to in-
troduce a few extensions to the notation used in the previous sections: Let each
agent i represent its IT demand as a vector of requested bandwidth allocations:
Ti = (ti1, . . . , tili). An assignment of an agent’s demand is a mapping that pins each
one of the components of the vector to a different time slot. A set of such assignments
(one per agent) comprises a potential configuration or schedule of IT utilization at
the shared link. Let k = mi(j) be the time slot assigned to the j
th component of user
i’s request vector. Denote by xik the actual allocation for player i in time slot k, i.e.
108
xik = ti,mi(j). The xik notation implicitly represents the mapping mi(), noting that
for time slots that are not used in the mapping, it is assumed that xik = 0. The xik
values thus defined are the same “fixed” components as used in the previous section.
The T&C marketplace is responsible for facilitating the trading process between
the users, providing the incentives and enforcing the outcome of the market. The in-
teractions of the users in the market are modeled as a pure-strategies non-cooperative
game where each user chooses an action base solely on its own selfish and rational
interest.3 The strategy space S∗i for agent i is the set of permutations of its request
vector Ti. As such, the strategy space is finite with cardinality |S
∗




game’s strategy space is the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces of all players:
S = ×Si. For simplicity of exposition, the initial presentation assumes all the points
in the strategy space are valid choices, and later on these results will be extended to
consider the existence of constraints in each player’s strategy space.
Theorem 11. The pure strategies game in which users adopt better/best responses
to allocate atomic units of traffic in per-user, mutually-exclusive time slots converges
to a NE when the per-slot cost function is the identity function.













where n is the number of users and T the number of time slots.












j denote the user allocation and the total utilization after the execution
3It should be pointed out that although the rationality assumption has been questioned in many
socio-economic settings, the resource management scheme considered in this thesis assumes that the
trading is done by utility maximizing software agents, thus making this consideration unnecessary.
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of the move.
Notice that for any other player k 6= i, its utilization of interval j does not change,









































where the last step uses the fact that U ′j − Uj =
1
C
(x′ij − xij) because players other
than i did not change their allocations. The atomicity of the components implies



























The last expression and the fact that C > 0 allows to conclude that expression (5.16)
is also negative, hence ∆ci +
∑
k 6=i ∆ck = ∆Φ < 0. i.e. Φ is strictly decreasing and
knowing that it is lower-bounded by some constant greater than zero, this allows to
conclude Φ is a potential for the game.
Convergence with constraints:
As alluded before, it may be the case that an agent may have additional constraints
that limit its strategy space – e.g., a 2-hour-long IT fixed bandwidth allocation must
be assigned in consecutive time slots, and be scheduled to start between 6pm and
8pm. Such constraints are easily captured by defining the player’s strategy space
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as a subset of Si ⊆ S
∗
i . This particular case was included in both the prototype
implementation and the experimental evaluation of the T&C mechanism. For this
purpose, the IT tasks are defined as collections of non-overlapping sessions, where
each session represents a task larger than the time slot quantum, but must be al-
located atomically – i.e. its component subtasks must be allocated to consecutive
time slots. The proposed implementation also allows specifying a slack indicating
the number of time slots the tasks may be shifted back or forward on the schedule.
Other types of constraints important in practice are: (1) Capacity constraints to
ensure that the shared link capacity is never exceeded by the aggregate allocation
– ∀j :
∑n
i=1 xij ≤ C, and (2) Budget constraints to ensure that no agent is able
to reserve resources beyond his fair share, which is upper-bounded by the agent’s
allowance – ∀i :
∑T
j=1 xijUj ≤ Bi.
Notice that both sets of constraints correspond to the elimination of infeasible
points in the strategy space S. This removal can be easily accomplished by setting
to ∞ the cost per player for those points.
Theorem 12. (Convergence to NE under constraints) Given a pure strategies game,
such that each player’s action space is finite, and that better/best response dynam-
ics converge to a NE, then after adding constraints to the action space of one or
more players, the better/best response dynamics still converge, given that there exists
feasible configurations after the addition of the constraints.
Proof. Consider the following directed graph G =< V,E >: There is a vertex vj ∈ V
for every possible point in the strategy space vj = (a1j1 , . . . , anjn), where aij denotes
the jth action of player i. There is and edge epq ∈ E for any valid transition
4 on
the strategy space, i.e. the cost associated with player i at vertex p is larger than
the cost at vertex q: cp(i) > cq(i) and a−i,p = a−i,q, meaning that the actions of all
players other than i are the same in p and q. Let us call G the transition graph of
the game. Then, if the better/best-response dynamics always converge to a NE in
the unconstrained case, G is a DAG. Any path (sequence of actions) the players
4Observe that the set of edges in not limited to best-responses, but includes any feasible move
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traverse when following their rational-selfish goal will always reach a vertex with
no outgoing edges corresponding to a NE (of possibly many) of the game. The
addition of constraints to the players actions, corresponds to removing unfeasible
vertices from V as well as the edges coming into or out of these vertices. Let G′ be
the residual transition graph after removing unfeasible vertices and edges. Suppose
the better/best-response dynamics with constraints do not always converge to a NE.
Then, there exists at least one cycle in the residual transition graph G′. Being G′
a subgraph of G this implies the same cycle must exist in the original graph G,
contradicting the fact that G is a DAG.
Figure 5·3 illustrates the construction used in the proof. In (a) it shows the DAG
corresponding to the transitions of some hypothetical game, where states v6 and v8
are the NE. In (b) v4 and v6 have been removed with their respective edges because
they are unfeasible. The NE in the residual graph are v3 and v8. Notice that the
set of NE vertices after the addition of constraints need not to be the same as those
of the unconstrained game. In particular, feasible vertices that were not a NE will
become a NE if all their outgoing edges are removed.
(a) Without constraints (b) With constraints
Figure 5·3: Transition graphs for a pure strategies game.
Price of Anarchy (PoA):
An important consideration when considering equilibria of non-cooperative games is
the Price of Anarchy – the ratio of the social cost at the worst-case equilibrium com-
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pared to the optimal cost. In the Atomic Trading case, the social cost (understood
as the metric the system wants to optimize) is the maximum resource utilization.
Theorem 13. (Price of Anarchy for Atomic Trading with no constraints) The PoA
of the Atomic Trading game with no constraints is 2.
Proof. Consider the interval with minimum usage5 umin. Then for all intervals j,
umin ≤ uj
Assume the game is at a NE. Let x, y be the size of tasks of user i on intervals min
and j respectively. Then by the equilibrium condition it must be the case that for
all intervals j
xumin + yuj ≤ y(umin − x + y) + x(uj − y + x)
≤ yumin + xuj + (x− y)
2
(x− y)(umin − uj) ≤ (x− y)
2 (5.17)
If x ≥ y, eq. (5.17) is always satisfied as the left hand side is always negative or
zero and the right hand side is always zero or positive. If x < y, eq. (5.17) can be
simplified as
uj − umin ≤ y − x (5.18)
in other words, eq. (5.18) gives an upper bound for the difference between any
interval and the interval with least utilization. In particular, it holds for the interval
with highest utilization:
umax − umin ≤ y − x (5.19)




j xij be the total mass. Then,
the following relation always holds:
umin(T − 1) + umax ≤M (5.20)
A perfectly even distribution of the mass on all the slots would give an usage of M/T
per slot, and if tmax is the maximum size of any subtask, then a lower bound for the
5Usage refers to the total allocation previous to normalizing by the capacity, i.e. Uj = uj/C.
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optimal maximum usage can be established as follows:
max{tmax,M/T} ≤ OPT
so, it must be the case that M ≤ T · OPT and tmax ≤ OPT . Replacing the first
condition on (5.20) gives
umin(T − 1) + umax ≤ T ·OPT (5.21)
Also, as tmax is the upper bound of the task size, then y − x ≤ tmax, therefore from
the second condition in (5.19)
umax − umin ≤ OPT
or
umax −OPT ≤ umin
this is a lower bound on umin, which after replacing in (5.21) gives
(umax −OPT )(T − 1) + umax ≤ T ·OPT






OPT < 2 ·OPT
i.e. the PoA is 2.
This bound is tight, as illustrated by the example in Fig. 5·4. In this example,
all the tasks are singletons (chains of length=1). Part (a) illustrates a NE where
the maximum load is 2tmax. Part (b) illustrates an optimal allocation where the
maximum load is tmax + ε. Setting ε = tmax/T , the ratio between the load at NE
and the optimal solution approaches 2 as T becomes very large.
As previously stated, practical applications may impose constraints on the set of
valid allocations (strategies) for the user. In particular, one of those constraints is the
ordering constraint, which states that for all pairs tij, tik such that j < k it must be
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(a) Nash-Equilibrium (b) Optimal
Figure 5·4: Tight example of PoA for unconstrained game
the case that the mappings m(j) < m(k), i.e. the relative ordering of the subtasks is
preserved. A typical example is when tasks have functional dependencies – a subtasks
cannot be executed until its antecessor is completed. As pointed out previously, the
NE when there are constraints may not be the same, and the unconstrained PoA
no longer holds. The following theorem states the PoA of the game with ordering
constraints.
Theorem 14. (Price of Anarchy for Atomic Trading with ordering constraints)
When user sessions are described as finite ordered sequences of atomic tasks, the
PoA on the per-slot load is n.
Proof. A loose bound on the PoA for the trading game is trivial: Given a maximum
allocation per user, Xmax, it may be the case that all the n users have an equally-
large demand, and there exists a NE where these demands coincide in the same time
slot. On the other hand, there is always going to be a slot with utilization of at least
Xmax, therefore this is a lower-bound on the slot usage. This gives an initial set of
bounds
Xmax ≤ max{uj} ≤ nXmax





To show that this bound is tight, Fig. 5·5 shows an instance that realizes it. In
this example there are n players, each one having a session of length n + kn, and
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(a) Optimal placement with max{uj} = Xmax
(b) NE with max{uj} = nXmax
Figure 5·5: Tight example for the PoA of the Bandwidth Trading Game
the total number of time slots is n + kn + n − 1 = n(k + 2) − 1. Fig. 5·5a shows
the optimal allocation which yields an max{uj} = Xmax, and part (b) shows a NE
whose max{uj} = nXmax. Part (b) is a NE because any unilateral deviation by any









And the cost for a player if he moves any integral number of positions (within the









and c′i > ci whenever k ≥ (n− 1)X
2
max.
The Price of Anarchy is a worst-case metric and for this particular problem
realizing it requires a carefully crafted problem instance. To explore its behavior
when the sets of tasks have randomly distributed sizes, a series of simulations were
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conducted, according the following procedure:
1. Create a problem instance whose optimal allocation is known. The load-
balancing problem itself is NP-Complete6. On the other hand, constructing
an instance with a known optimal solution is simple: Take the slots, assume
they are all equally filled say with 1 unit. Split the content of each slot in
several fractions and then take sequences of elements from different slots to be
the tasks of the players. Finally, shuffle around the tasks of the players and
this gives a problem instance.
2. For different numbers of players (this defines the game size) and of time slots
we create multiple problem instances. For this experiment 100 instances were
evaluated per game size.
3. Run the game by letting the players take turns and play their best response
until the game reaches a NE. Take the maximum among all the instances of
the same size, and then compute the ratio with respect to the known optimum.
This gives the empirical ratio of the worst-case to the optimal.
The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 5·6, with 5 slots (a) and 10 slots
(b). Empirically, the PoA for the atomic trading is generally below 2, and tends to
be insignificant as the number of players (size of the game) increases, which bodes
well for T&C’s targeted applications.
6It is easy to see this by reduction from the 2-Partition [GJ79] problem. If an algorithm could
solve the load-balancing problem in polynomial time, then it would solve the partition problem in
polynomial time as well. Simply run the load-balancing algorithm with two slots using the same
inputs of the partition problem. If the sum of the elements on each slot is equal, the answer to the






























































(a) 5 Slots (b) 10 Slots
Figure 5·6: Empirical Price-of-Anarchy based on synthetic worksets
5.5 T&C: Combining Atomic and Fluid Tasks
The previous two sections consider the trading mechanism when there is a single class
of jobs in the system, either fluid or atomic. There are many cases in computing
systems where both kinds of tasks must be handled simultaneously. For example an
end user may be viewing a streamed video and doing some downloads. The video
stream needs to deliver a frame every frame-period, otherwise the playback quality
will be very poor.7 On the other hand, the downloads do not suffer by changes in
the rate, the perception of quality depends only on the total download time which
is minimized when the download increases its share of the capacity over time.
5.5.1 Problem Formulation
Each user in the system has a profile of atomic tasks given by the vector Ti =
(ti1, . . . , tili). The allocation of the tasks in the system has an associated constant
utility which is larger than the utility obtained from the fluid tasks. The utility
derived from the fluid allocation is strictly increasing with respect to the total fluid
reservation, but the time at which the reservation is made is irrelevant. The user’s
7For the sake of simplicity this example ignores the buffering process normally used when stream-
ing video, but this does not change the fundamental issue: n-frames must be delivered each n-periods
or the buffer will underflow and the playback will freeze.
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objective is to maximize its total utility subject to a budget constraint in the cost
of the reservations made, and possibly some constraints the assignment of atomic
tasks to time slots. The mapping of the atomic tasks into the corresponding time
slot is defined as m : {1, . . . , li} → {1, . . . , T}, so that k = m(j) is the slot assigned
to task tij, being T the number of slots in the system. For notational simplicity,
xik = tij when task j is mapped into slot k, or zero if no task is mapped to slot k.
Xi = (xik, . . .) is the vector of allocations of atomic tasks. The fluid allocations are
indicated by the vector Wi = (wij, . . .).
It is assumed that the allocation of atomic tasks is always feasible, meaning
that at each user is guaranteed the utility associated its atomic tasks. In this case,
and being the utility of fluid tasks strictly increasing with respect to the total fluid
allocation, the user’s objective is to find the mapping m and the vector of fluid









(xik + wik)Uk ≤ Bi (5.22)
The combination of the discrete and the real components in the solution of this
problem makes its solution more challenging. The following theorem allows separat-
ing the solution of the atomic allocation and the fluid allocation.
Theorem 15. Given the identity cost function f(Uj) = Uj, in the case where there is
fluid allocated in all slots (λp = 0, p = 1, . . . , T ), the maximum user fluid allocation
occurs when the cost of its atomic tasks X∗i is minimal.
Proof. Let Xi 6= X
∗
i be an allocation of atomic tasks that does not give the minimum
cost. Let Wi be the vector of fluid allocations corresponding to the solution of the
8here the cost function is restricted to the case of f(Uj) = Uj as the results of Section 5.4 have
been proven only for this case.
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per-user optimal when the atomic allocations are Xi. Then, from eq. (5.8) and after





































λ∗T+1 > λT+1 (5.23)




is independent of the particular X, thus λT+1 = λ
∗
T+1 contradicting 5.23.
The previous result would give a direct methodology for the optimal T&C mar-
ketplace if the optimal allocation of the atomic components was easy to find. Un-
fortunately, this problem is an NP-complete problem, as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 16. Finding the optimal allocation of atomic tasks in the T&C market-
place is NP-complete
Proof. By reduction to the 2-partition problem. Take an instance of 2-partition
defined by the set {xi, . . .}. Let each xi be an independent tasks (one per user). Let







, and set the number of slots to 2. If there
is a 2-partition of the set, the unit price per slot is p = 1
2
∑
i xi, so give each user
a budget Bi = p ∗ xi. If the T&C marketplace could find the optimal solution for
this problem in polynomial time, it would solve any instance of 2-partition in
polynomial time.
120
A Practical Approach: The lack of a polynomial-time solution for atomic case,
which combined with the fluid would give a globally optimal allocation and a NE
equilibrium for all the users, the practical approach used by the T&C marketplace
is to let the user bid until the marketplace reaches a NE. Being a local-optimal, the
NE solution is then used to compute the fluid allocations for all the users.
5.6 Prototype Implementation
Figure 5·7: Overall T&C Architecture
The general architecture of the system is illustrated in Figure 5·7. Its main
components are:
1. Traffic Characterization: Uses a statistical characterization technique to
create a profile of the user’s IT demand.
2. Marketplace: Divided into user-side and router-side agents. The user-side
takes the user’s profile and submits its request to the server side-agent. The
server-side agent accepts the bids from the user agents and reports back the
corresponding costs. This iterative process stops when the marketplace reaches
a NE, which settles the allocations for an epoch.
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3. Traffic Policing: The outcome of the marketplace is enforced by the policing
agents. A policing agent on the router enforces that the total (i.e., irrespective
of traffic class) allocation. The user side implements the queue disciplines nec-
essary for assuring the QoS of the various traffic classes. The class assignment
is done on the user side, and although defaults for the most common profiles
could be provided, the final assignment can be controlled via a configuration
interface. The fact that the router does not do the classification, but only
enforces the total allocation ensures the neutrality and fairness of the scheme.
The prototype implementation of the system runs on Linux hosts (both user
and router functionalities). It implements the traffic policing component using the
HTB [Dev03] packet scheduler system. Figure 5·8 illustrates the mapping of the
allocations established by the demand-based marketplace into the parameters of a
user-side two-class HTB. The root class enforces the physical rate of the bottleneck
link. This is important when user systems are connected by a high-speed Ethernet,
but share a much slower Internet connection.9 The HTB system is work-conserving,
which means that if there are packets waiting in any of the queues and the output
link is not being utilized, it will deliver the packets. Thanks to this feature, in the
case where the traffic from one class exceeds its current allocation and the other
is below, the system defaults to a standard best-effort service, limited only by the
actual physical rate of the link (r in the illustration).
The market agent simply runs as a background process and adjusts the allocations
(xij, wij) at the beginning of each time slot. It also communicates with the router’s
marketplace service ahead of the start of each epoch (e.g. a day) to negotiate the
allocations for the next epoch. An important detail is that, if for some time slot the
profile has xij = 0 and the demand from other users is very high, it may turn out
9In practice the system should implement two different 1st level classes, one for the local LAN
traffic and the other for Internet traffic. We only present the simplified version.
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Figure 5·8: HTB-based implementation of the traffic policing component
that the allocation wij for this user is also zero, leaving no reservation for the user.
To avoid this situation, our mechanism imposes a lower-threshold xmin to the profile,
thus ensuring that all the users get at least some minimal allocation available at any
time.
On the router side, the configuration of both the downstream and the upstream
HTB “police agents” (responsible for the policing functionality) is a little different
(from the router’s perspective these are egress agents). In this case there is a single
police agent per user whose committed rate is the rate reserved for the timeslot,
but the peak rate is the line-speed. This allows exploiting the work-conserving
property of HTB: when the demand of some users is below their reservation, the
available bandwidth is distributed among the other users in proportion to their
reservations. The router does not do any packet classification, which minimizes
overhead and makes the router operate in an application-agnostic manner, thus
ensuring the neutral character of the service.
Algorithmic Complexity and Efficient Distributed Implementation: For a
scheme like the one examplained above to be practical, it needs to have a compu-
tationally efficient solution. In the case of fluid allocation, the solution using La-
grange multipliers presented in Section 5.3 constitutes a straightforward distributed
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implementation, whereby at the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) each agent
computes its best response iteratively until the marketplace reaches a NE.
As for the trading of atomic tasks, the computation of best-response in the pres-
ence of constraints (such as preserving the ordering or the adjacency of session com-
ponents) is a difficult problem. For its solution, a dynamic programming algorithm
was devised. This algorithm is pseudo-polynomial (complexity depends on the prod-
uct of the number of sessions per user and the number of time slots) and runs in a
few seconds on current hardware for instances of practical sizes of hundreds of users
and hundreds of time slots (108 and 288, respectively in the experimental evaluation
of §5.7). The dynamic programming solution, when finding the best response for
user i proceeds as follows:
1. Let k be number of sessions of user i, and T the number of time slots
2. Initialize the matrix A of dimension k×T . Each element ajp of A will represent
the cumulative cost of sessions 1 . . . j ≤ k, when the jth session is allocated in
slot p. All the matrix elements are initialized to infinity.
3. The first row is computed by assuming session 1 is placed in slot p and com-
puting the resulting cost.
4. As the user’s sessions do not overlap, the cost of allocating each new session is
given by the recurrence
ajp =
{
∞ if session j is unfeasible at slot p
min{aj−1,1...p−1}+ c(j, p) otherwise
(5.24)
where c(j, p) represents the cost of session j when allocated beginning at slot p.
All the subsequent rows are computed using this recurrence and the minimum
of the last row min{ak,1...T} will give the optimal cost for the entire set of
sessions of the user.
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The feasibility condition in equation (5.24) refers to the constraints of the problem.
Basically, all the components of the session fall within the allowed time slots (1 . . . T ),
and the cumulative cost is less or equal to the budget. The experimental evaluation
did not include the capacity constraint, although it could be easily incorporated into
the procedure.
5.7 Experimental Evaluation
This section presents a trace-driven evaluation of the T&C system that shows the
benefits obtainable under real network workloads. In the first place, a brief descrip-
tion of the traces and the pre-processing done for the different experiments is done.
Next, an evaluation of the demand-based fluid trading system is presented, followed
by an experimental evaluation of the atomic trading system, and last an evaluation
including the composition of both systems.
5.7.1 Traces and Trace Pre-Processing
Publicly available WAN traces [MAW09] were used to conduct the experimental
evaluation of the system. These traces provide packet-level information on a high
capacity WAN link. Table 5.1 summarizes the characteristics of this trace. For all
the experiments, the traffic was aggregated in 5min time slots, a sample of a 24hr
period was used, thus giving 288 time slots.




Total TCP bytes (payload) 924,540,189,060
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the WAN trace used in the evaluation.
The pre-processing steps used to extract the traffic associated with a customer
access network were: First, identify subnets most likely associated with broadband
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users, based on the upstream/downstream ratios, the activity per port number,
and diurnal activity patterns. Next, assuming that each IP address is a single
user/household, classify the traffic per user as either atomic of fluid. The general
criteria used was that sessions due to interactive applications such as web-browsing,
VoIP, media streaming are taken as interactive, and traffic due to P2P and other
applications was assumed to be fluid. As in the atomic-trading phase considers the
possibility that IT may also have some degree of delay-tolerance, the term Fluid-
Traffic (FT) is used to refer specifically to fluid applications. The classification
is done based on association of traffic activity with privileged port numbers. Re-
search on traffic classification schemes has been very active recently (See for example
[BTS06, KPF05, KBFc04, MZ05, MP05, SSW04, MPS09]) and potentially any of
those schemes could be incorporated (e.g. as a library) in the implementation of the
T&C marketplace. The last step is to identify the various IT sessions per user, with
their corresponding demands per time slot. Session identification is done by setting
a threshold on the length of periods of high activity. This threshold is called Smax
and it is given as a number of time slots. For most of the experiments the values
Smax = 6 and Smax = 12 were used. The first one corresponds to a half an hour
period, and the second to a one hour period. If any sequence of time slots has length
greater than Smax, then the minimum from this interval was subtracted under the
assumption that it was due to FT. By repeating this process on any subinterval of
length greater than Smax gives a set of disjoint IT sessions for the user. Figure 5·9
shows the aggregated inbound traffic for the selected subnetwork for both classes,
IT and FT.
Budget assignment: To conduct the experiments, the budget was assigned so that
the total budget accounts for the total traffic in the trace if transmitted at a constant






























Figure 5·9: Downstream trace for a subnet of broadband users
5.7.2 Evaluation of the Demand-Based Fluid Trading System
The first set of experiments analyzes the effect of the fluid trading phase alone.
In these experiments the IT components of the trace are the fixed allocations xij
and the fluid component is dropped and allocated by the marketplace. The result
of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 5·10. The IT traffic (whose allocation is
preserved after the market clearing phase) is comparatively small. The curves for the
total traffic (IT+FT) before the marketplace allocation shows high variability with
peak throughput or about 274Mbps. After the redistribution of FT traffic the total
link reservation is essentially constant at about 138Mbps. The 95% of the original
traffic trace is 206Mbps, therefore there is a significant reduction of peak utilization,
which in cases where the cost is determined by the 95/5 rule means a significant
reduction of cost as well. The fact that a significant fraction of the trace is P2P
traffic (and thus handled as fluid allocation), made it possible to for the mechanism
to achieve an almost perfect load-balance of the utilization.
Another important observation comes from comparing the total (over all times-
lots) per user allocation of IT against its FT. Figure 5·11 shows this. Although the
relationship looks linear, it is important to notice that it does not need to be so. For
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Figure 5·10: Traffic before and after marketplace reallocation
example two different users with the same amount of IT traffic, one of them at peak
hours, while the other at off-peak hours will get very different amounts of FT. Notice
though that the marketplace incentivizes users to declare their true IT profile. If a
user declares less, well he/she may get less and his/her interactive applications will
suffer. On the other hand, requesting more than necessary will never get the user
more than what the optimal allocation does.















Figure 5·11: IT vs FT components per user
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5.7.3 Evaluation of the Atomic Trading System
To test the atomic trading functionality, the IT components of the traces were taken
as the fixed tasks input to the T&C marketplace. In addition, as network sessions
typically span over multiple time slots, the constraint that the entire session had to
be preserved (no breaking or re-ordering its components) was implemented. As a
mechanism to indicate to the system the flexibility of IT sessions, a slack parameter
was introduced. This parameter indicates the number of time slots a session may be
moved back or forward in time. So for example, a slack of 0 implies no flexibility. A
slack of 1 implies a willingness to shift sessions by one time slot (5 minutes in the
traces) back or forth, if such a shift is advantageous. Notice that moving a session
means a shift of the traffic attributed to that session for all time slots spanned
by that session (i.e., traffic in all time slots of a single session is shifted equally
to preserve session atomicity). The simulations also enforce the condition that no
shifting sessions could overlap. This is consistent with users not doing more activities
on the same time slot.
The first experiment aims to evaluate how the 95th percentile of the link’s 5-
minute traffic volume (the 95% traffic envelop) changes as a result of letting users
schedule their IT sessions. For brevity, it is assumed that all users adopt the same
slack value for all their sessions. Figure 5·12 shows two examples of the outcome
after the market reaches an equilibrium. On the left is the traffic per time slot,
and on the right is the CDF of traffic per time slot. Top row is for session length
threshold of Smax = 6, and the bottom row is for Smax = 12 time slots. Clearly, the
session thresholding process has little effect on the trace, being the most noticeable
effect the larger peak (from 130MB to 150MB). Table 5.2 shows the values of the
95% traffic envelop. These results underscore that selfishly scheduling IT sessions
yields an equilibrium with significant reduction in the 95% traffic envelop – up to
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31% reduction when slack is 1 hours. Even for a small slack of 15 minutes, the
savings amount to 16%.








































Smax = 6 (1/2 an hour)









































Smax = 12 (one hour)
Figure 5·12: Utilization over time for IT sessions with various slack values.
5.7.4 Evaluation of Combined Atomic and Fluid Trading
The last set of experiments considers both phases of T&C. In particular, after
completing the trading phase – thus scheduling all IT sessions in the trace – users
allocate as much fluid traffic as possible in accordance with their remaining budgets.
Thus, an important consideration in setting-up these experiments is the budget
130
Smax = 6 Smax = 12
Slack 95%(MB) Reduction% 95%(MB) Reduction%
0 36.3 0.0 47.7 0.0
3 30.6 15.6 42.1 11.7
6 27.4 24.4 33.6 29.6
12 24.9 31.4 30.9 35.2
Table 5.2: 95% utilization resulting from bandwidth trading.
assignment. In particular, the following policy was used: Let V denote the nominal
traffic per time slot that results in a total volume equal to the total traffic originally
in the trace. Let R (for resistance) be a control parameter which allows the provider
to adjust the resulting traffic on the shared link. By setting C = V/R (C is the
constant used for normalizing utilization, see §5.2), and the budget per customer to
Bi = CT/n, the expected utilization (without IT) is precisely C.
Figure 5·13 shows the outcome of the two phases of T&C for a value of R = 1.0
and various slack values. The y-axis is normalized with respect to V (the nominal
volume under perfectly balanced conditions, with no IT components). Due to the
presence of IT components, this quantity is always (slightly) larger than 1.0. The
session identification process also capture a much larger peak in the case of Smax =
12. Table 5.3 shows the 95% and 50% (median) of the time slot utilizations, as well
as the ratio between them. These results suggest that with T&C in place, the ratio is
nearly 1.0, resulting in a perfect flattening of traffic over time slots, thus eliminating
cost problems derived from spikes when using the 95/5 rule.
95% Median Ratio
Original 197.15 124.56 1.583
T&C Smax = 6 136.52 135.93 1.004
T&C Smax = 12 138.05 137.33 1.005
Table 5.3: Traffic volume statistics (in MB) with and without T&C
The parameter R allows the provider to specify a target total traffic volume on
the managed link. Figure 5·14a shows the total allocation per time slot as a function
of R, when slack=0 (which is the worst-case in the sense that under this scenario
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(a) Smax = 6 (b) Smax = 12
Figure 5·13: Total Traffic (IT+FT) for various slack values.
there is no IT flexibility). As expected, R effectively controls the aggregate traffic
volume resulting from T&C. This volume is almost flat due to the “fluid” nature of
FT bandwidth allocation. The exception is due to spikes underscoring the presence
of large IT sessions that could not be smoothed out under the chosen slack value.
Naturally, these spikes dissipate when larger slack values are used (see Figure 5·13).
The impact of the allocation of FT relative to IT is evaluated in Figure 5·14b,
which compares the per-user bandwidth allocations for different values of the resis-
tance, R. As before, the general trend is that the more IT bandwidth requested by a
user during the trading phase, the less FT allocation the user is able to secure during
the capping phase. Increasing the values of R results in a corresponding reduction
in the aggregate allocation of FT bandwidth, with large IT bandwidth consumers
impacted the most.
To evaluate T&C on a per-user basis, a comparison on how IT and FT allocations
vary across users was done. Figure 5·15 (left) shows a clear negative correlation
between the allotment of FT and IT bandwidth. The relationship is not monotonic
or deterministic because it depends on the outcomes from the atomic phase, which
affect the left-over budget for each player. It is always the case though that the larger














































(a) Per time slot (b) FT vs IT per user
Figure 5·14: Traffic allocations for variable R.
vertical line in the plot). An agent with fixed IT demand increases its allocation
of FT bandwidth when it adds more flexibility to its IT sessions. The results in
Table 5.4 expose this tradeoff for selected levels of IT demand and resistances. For
example, when R = 4, a user with a nominal 100MB of IT bandwidth is able to
capture 32% more FT traffic by accepting a minimal slack of 3 for its IT sessions. A
rather surprising (and also desirable) finding – evident from Figure 5·15 and Table
5.4 – is that the user begets most of the benefit by introducing a minimal amount
of slack. Increasing the slack beyond that, results in only marginal increases in FT
allocation. In the above example, by doubling its slack from 3 to 6, the user is
able to capture only 3% more FT traffic. Figure 5·15 (right) shows the same results
on a semi-log scale to expose the outcome for users with negligible demand for IT
bandwidth. In this case, the capping phase assigns to all such users almost equal
share of the capacity (as expected). It is only the heavy IT bandwidth hogs who are
unable to claim much FT bandwidth, which is precisely the premise of T&C.
R=4.0 R=2.0 R=1.0
Slack 100MB 200MB 400MB
3 1.3190 1.2836 1.1931
6 1.3497 1.3338 1.2329
12 1.4079 1.3769 1.2520
Table 5.4: FT gain for various values of R and IT demand.
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Figure 5·15: IT and FT allocations per user for different slack values.
5.8 Related Word
The problem of allocating the traffic of multiple users to various traffic classes when
using a QoS mechanism is interesting because selfish users are willing to present all
their traffic as high priority traffic to the system. This problem has been considered
from a game-theoretic perspective by various works, for example [Mar04, PSC98,
CP99]. Marback [Mar04] analyzes a priority queueing scheme where packets get
charged based on their priority, and selfish users compete for bandwidth. Among
other things, he shows that such a scheme leads to a Wardrop equilibrium and
that allocation does not depend on the prices of each traffic class. A fundamental
distinction with respect to T&C is that T&C enables different valuations for different
classes of traffic, and uses these valuations to leverage the trading system. Park et al
[PSC98] consider a QoS class assignment game where users share a single Generalized
Processor Sharing (GPS) queue and they can assign the class for the traffic. Users do
so, to meet the QoS requirements of their application at the minimum possible costs
(as higher priority also means higher cost). In this work, they consider both, the
case where traffic may be arbitrarily split between the many service classes and the
unsplittable case where all the traffic is assigned to the same class. In the splittable
case, NE need not exists, but it is proven that in the unsplittable clase NE always
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exists. Chen et al [CP99] consider the assignment of service classes to each user’s
traffic at each one of the routers in a path. In this analysis, each user provides a
QoS vector and a utility function, and the user actions are the choices of service
classes at each router, such that his traffic will meet the QoS goals with minimum
cost. This model is limited to the unsplittable case, meaning that all the traffic from
a user is assigned the same service class. The incentive for the users is implicit in
the price-by-class scheme, where users requesting higher priority classes pay more.
In addition, payment has to be made to all intermediary nodes on a route. Chen
et al [CP98] also provide an efficient distributed implementation and evaluation of
their multi-switch QoS assignment game, where agents running at the routers and
end-points compute the game outcome on behalf of the users. The performance
evaluation shows a significant improvement on the per-application QoS metrics with
respect to a static reservation mechanism. A common characteristic of these set
of works is that they focus in situations where a set of concurrent flows share the
resource, as opposed to T&C where the schedule of tasks of different classes creates
the tradeoff for the users to reallocate their tasks in such a manner that improves
the performance for different traffic classes (response times, aggregated throughput).
Approaches for congestion-pricing with explicit payments have been considered
in a number of studies. Henderson et al [HCB01] present a review of the benefits
and limitations of these proposals. Examples include Smart Markets [MMV95b,
MMV95a] and Split-Edge Pricing [Bri99]. Of particular interest is the scheme pro-
posed by Ganesh et al [GLS01], which assigns costs to packets depending on conges-
tion. Under a family of non-linear cost functions that depend on the utilization of
the congested link and the flow’s demand, they showed convergence to steady-state
equilibrium. While our mechanism and system model are entirely different, our cost
function has similar characteristics. A fundamental different in our scheme is that
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the tradeoff for the users comes from the schedule of their tasks, and it is not an
instantaneous congestion-control mechanism. In fact, the T&C marketplace is in-
tended to serve as a high level meta-scheduler between the applications sharing the
resource.
Laoutaris and Rodriguez [LR08], note that the problems associated with large
demands for DT traffic could be alleviated if DT traffic were scheduled over periods
of low demand. However, systems currently deployed lack incentive mechanisms to
do so, and the low-demand periods are typically not synchronized when a network
path traverses several time zones. As a solution to the first problem, they suggest
giving users “higher-than-purchased” access rate during off-peak hours as a reward
for time-shifting their DT traffic. As a solution to the second problem, they propose
the introduction of a store-and-forward service to handle the network transfer of
bulk DT data during off-peak hours. This second model is further developed in
[LSRS09], where several algorithms are proposed for scheduling the delivery of DTB
traffic across a wide area network. These mechanisms address the problem when the
tasks are under the control of a single authority that can optimize and schedule the
execution of the tasks accordingly. The T&C marketplace addresses the problem
when multiple non-cooperative agents share the resource.
5.9 Summary
This chapter presents the T&C marketplace as a coordination mechanism for allow-
ing the load-balancing of a common resource shared by multiple selfish and ratio-
nal parties. The mechanism incentives users to schedule their delay-tolerant tasks
at times of low demand, and the incentive is delivered in terms of the amount of
resource allocation provided, enabling the T&C marketplace to operate in environ-
ments where currency exchange is not possible.
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The analysis of T&C shows that in the case of a fluid-task market, there is a
single global optimum which is also an equilibrium for the users. In the case of
atomic-task market, there may be multiple Nash Equilibria, but a better-response
bidding process is proven to converge to the equilibrium. Although the Price of
Anarchy associated with this process is n, in practice when the number of users (and
tasks) involved is large, it is typically very small. The combination of both atomic
and fluid markets is possible and its solution is again an equilibrium that achieves a
load-balanced system, limited only but the tasks with no flexibility.
The experimental evaluation of the system shows that in a real-life scenario T&C
can achieve a significant reduction of the peak-to-valley ratio of the workload over
time. This is particularly interesting in cases where service rates are dependent on




Along with the deployment of wide-area network infrastructures, many new services
and applications have come into existence. This services rely on sharing resources
for efficiency, but the sharing of resources raises many challenging problems as well.
One of the most fundamental problems is the network embedding problem: finding
and allocating resources for the applications on a given infrastructure. In this thesis
we presented contributions on three facets of the problem: 1) when users need to
find feasible sets of resources that meet the requirements of their applications, 2)
when users reserve fractions of shared resources, and share the costs in proportion
to their reserved fractions, and 3) when the users’ applications share resources over
time, but the lack of coordination is detrimental for both the users and the provider.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
Our first contribution, netEmbed addresses the first facet. netEmbed includes
a language for describing the applications’ requirements and the infrastructure ca-
pabilities, and mapping algorithms for finding feasible allocations of resources to
applications. netEmbed’s algorithms rely on constraint-satisfaction techniques,
which are proven to be free of false positives and free of false negatives. To address
the scalability problem, netEmbed introduces three search algorithms, Exhaustive
Search with Constraint Filtering (ECF), Random Walk with Backtracking (RWB),
and Lazy Neighborhood Search (LNS), exploiting two techniques to speed-up the
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search: 1) early pruning – removing unfeasible regions of the search space as soon
as possible, 2) candidate reordering – by organizing the candidate sets according to
their cardinality, the number of steps in the search process is minimized. The exper-
imental evaluation of these techniques shows that they scale to problem instances
in the range of thousands of nodes and links, with run times in the order of tens of
seconds. The experimental evaluation also shows that netEmbed’s algorithms are
complementary in the sense that ECF and RWB are better suited to handle very
constrained problems, while LNS performs better on problems with little constraints
or in which the constraints are loose (in the sense that they do not help prune many
candidates).
Our second contribution, the Colocation Games, address the problem of allo-
cating fractional capacities of the resources to different users and sharing the costs
in proportion to the fraction allocated by each user. Our analysis shows that for
the most general version of Colocation Game a Nash Equilibrium (NE) does not
necessarily exist. In contrast, the more restricted Process Colocation Game and
Uniform Parallel Process Colocation Game are shown to converge to a NE under
better-response dynamics. For these cases, bounds on the Price of Anarchy with re-
spect to the utilization of resources were proven. These results also extend to cases
where resources are described by multidimensional resource capacities, the Multidi-
mensional Process Colocation Game. The existence and convergence to a NE, the
fact that the PoA is bounded, and the experimental analysis that shows that in
practice under large numbers of users the outcome achieves high-utilization; let us
conclude that these variants of the Colocation Games serve as practical allocation
mechanisms in scenarios where applications need performance guarantees and overall
high-utilization yields high system efficiency.
Our third contribution, the Trade & Cap (T&C) marketplace addresses the prob-
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lem of sharing a resource over time, while minimizing the maximum utilization of
the resource. T&C creates a marketplace where allocation shares may be traded by
users, each one maximizing its own benifit. This mechanism is intended to be used
in scenarios where the resource is under a central control, but the scheduling of tasks
is at the discretion of the users. In many real systems pricing mechanisms are fixed
externally and cannot be changed. Instead, in T&C users trade allocation shares
whose value is driven by forces of supply and demand. In so doing, users get an
incentive in the form of a larger allocation if they schedule their delay-tolerant tasks
during periods of low demand. Fundamental properties of the marketplace such as
the existence of equilibria, the convergence, and the efficiency (in terms of balanced
load) were established analytically and evaluated experimentally, showing that for
both the users and the provider there are significant gains. The users benefit by
obtaining a larger aggregate allocation for delay-tolerant applications, and by im-
proving the QoS of interactive applications. The provider benefits as better balance
of system utilization translates into lower operating and provisioning costs.
6.2 Future Directions
Large distributed systems are essential elements in many applications running on
today’s Internet. Automating the resource management of such systems is funda-
mental to cope with their scale and to make efficient use of the available resources.
However, accomplishing this objective is non-trivial because of the contrasting in-
terests of the various parties involved. Nevertheless, efficiency is a common goal for
both sides: Achieving better utilization of the resources improves the profitability
for providers and lowers the cost for the consumers. A fundamental challenge in the
area is the design of mechanisms that allow the parties to realize this synergy.
Standard mechanisms from micro-economics are not necessarily applicable for
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the management of computing resources. For example, common assumptions such
as explicit knowledge of private valuations, that valuations can be expressed using
a common currency, and that the parties are willing to disclose their valuations,
do not always hold. T&C drops the first two. The goal of the mechanism can
be quite different as well. Micro-economic mechanisms commonly have the goal of
maximizing the social value, understood as the summation of the valuations of the
winners (users who get the resources). In the case of computing resources, when those
valuations are not explicitly known, this goal would be difficult to achieve. Instead,
some form of fairness, understood as an equitative (or proportional) distribution of
the resources among the users of the system is frequently preferred. There is then
a large spectrum of resource management problems where users of the system are
essentially uncooperative, but a mechanism that gives the right incentives may be
used to ensure overall efficiency and fairness.
In designing such mechanisms, many additional problems come into play as well.
For example how to enforce that the outcome of the mechanism is carried out (all the
parties comply with their commitments); if it is possible to implement the mechanism
relying only on local information, so that the mechanism can be implemented when
agents interact in a descentralized manner; or if the mechanism provides the means
to handle faulty or byzantine agents. The study of these problems is collectively
known as Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design, and although there are some
promising results, there are also many questions still open [FS02].
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[CV02] Artur Czumaj and Berthold Vöcking. Tight bounds for worst-case equi-
libria. In Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium
on Discrete algorithms (SODA), pages 413–420, Philadelphia, PA, USA,
2002. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
[Dev03] Martin Devera. HTB Home. Web page, July 2003. Available from:
http://luxik.cdi.cz/~devik/qos/htb/.
144
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